IDF's recently appointed Chief of General Staff Eyal Zamir has published a list of reforms relevant to post October 7th experiences, a lot of which rely heavily on a manpower increase. We'll get to the last part shortly.
Let's look at the reforms:
Ground
- Instructional units consolidated to a single maneuvering division. This includes the 460th armor brigade.
- New reserve 500th armor brigade. Its formation will start in 2026 and last 3 years at a rate of 1 battalion per year. This aligns its formation rate with MBT production rate, which means the IDF has returned to forming units through trickling equipment from active units.
It is not known what tanks it will receive.
A report that it depends on Barak MBT production rates could either indicate what I wrote above, or that it will receive Barak MBTs and become the reserve counterpart of the 401st. - After being shut down several years ago, recon companies will return to the active armor brigades.
- New active Combat Engineering battalion will be formed, bringing the total to 4. In the active forces, each armor brigade has 1 combat engineering battalion. The 4th battalion is attached to the Givati infantry brigade.
- Units are formed to reinforce the eastern border (Jordan) and a barrier is under construction. 11 battalions already formed.
Air Force
- New Air Defense brigade. Undisclosed equipment.
- Reorganization of attack drone capabilities and creation of a new array with undisclosed equipment.
Navy
Reorientation of the Navy as a strategic arm of the IDF in parallel with the IAF.
The Elephant In The Room
The biggest obstacle to implementing the ground reforms, is the lack of manpower. The reservists are strained and the IDF has to use its few maneuvering units to compensate for whenever reservists won't show up due to excessive stress.
The IDF has a manpower crisis. A big one. On October 7th, an emotional response drove hundreds of thousands of reservists to show up before they were even called. 150% mobilization rate was reported. People who weren't even called. But as some have been deployed for almost a year at a time and a year and a half total, people are struggling to keep their ordinary lives - careers, family, from collapsing. They need relief.
This hinges on a draft law that would remove exemptions from Ultra Orthodox Jewish people and boost the IDF with tens of thousands of fresh recruits.
Unfortunately, such law didn't pass, and just today the government negotiated away any meaningful enlistment.
It is therefore possible that these new reforms will either remain largely not implemented, or hopefully be implemented starting with the next government (elections November 2026), with the hope it will pass a new draft law then.
Some of the reforms do not need that law though, primarily the air force and navy ones.
The Air Force and Navy lists are short because of the more classified nature of their activities, but they are perhaps the most significant parts here.
Since Israel's formation, the navy was very mediterrannean-oriented and was meant to handle naval threats emanating from neighboring states like Egypt and Syria primarily.
At the time it was a huge task. The Air Force alone could not be relied upon to handle it, as it was not expected to achieve aerial supremacy automatically over any territory.
At the time it was a huge task. The Air Force alone could not be relied upon to handle it, as it was not expected to achieve aerial supremacy automatically over any territory.
The navy was thus a permanent presence that would handle threats through technology and ingenuity, rather than through sheer mass of ships and missiles.
1973 was the navy's last major engagement, and that war also cemented a new reality in which the mediterrannean is no longer the hostile arena it once was. Neither is the threat of a blockade on Israel's western ports. Yet it also drove the development of the larger Sa'ar 5 capable of longer distance operations. Since then Israel has also acquired the even larger Sa'ar 6.
In 1973 the Sa'ar 4, largest ship in the navy's service was less than 500 tons displacement. The Navy's current inventory:
Sa'ar 4.5 - 8 units, 500 tons.
Sa'ar 5 - 3 units, 1,200 tons.
Sa'ar 6 - 4 units, 1,900 tons.
Reshef - planned 5 units, ~1,000 tons.
Reshef is replacement of the Sa'ar 4.5. They are both OPVs. Yet we see the Navy chooses to double the displacement for that task, albeit at fewer units.
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| Left: Sa'ar 4.5 Right: Reshef |
Designed primarily for air defense tasks, the Sa'ar 6 was deployed to the Red Sea to counter cruise missiles and drones launched by the Houthis.
It is highly likely the Reshef class will be fitted with a capable air defense suit to take some of the homeland defense tasks away from and allow more autonomy to the Sa'ar 6.
The Sa'ar 6 and 5 could therefore be tasked with longer range missions oriented toward the Red Sea. From securing sea trade to combating the Houthis and potentially deploying against Iranian naval assets.
A proper reform to drive action against Iran would also involve increasingly larger and more numerous submarines, and larger and better equipped surface vessels, as well as a fleet of cheaper unmanned ships and submarines to compensate for the low capacity of the Israeli Navy.
Strike missions on Iran itself may be wasteful compared to utilizing the IAF. But Iran has substantial naval presence for which these could be relevant.
The biggest factor is that after a long period of Israel's Navy having been confined to a fairly safe neighborhood (mediterrannean), it is now tasked with operating in a new environment which necessitates longer trips in both distance and endurance.
Sources:
https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/ryjfwjp7gg#autoplay
https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-news/article-857341
https://news.walla.co.il/item/3756734
