Merkava Myth Busting

One of the things I've noticed in the past years when discussing the Merkava and its comparison with other tanks, is that most people base their view on it, on myths. 

I'll try to deal with some of the more prominent ones here:

Myth #1: The Engine is its Main Armor

This is not entirely true. While the Merkava variants Mk1 through Mk3 have relatively thin and unimpressive hull front armor, it is not the case for the Merkava 4. In fact, the Line of Sight (LoS) thickness of the Merkava 4 hull armor is very similar to that of contemporary tanks. Thickness alone is not what decides armor effectiveness and capabilities, but it does show that volume constraints on the Mark 4 were not a serious factor, at least not nearly on the level of past variants.

So where did this myth come from? 

When the Merkava 1 was developed, Israel was in a position in which:

1. It did not develop nor locally produce Powerpacks that it could design to its own requirements.
2. Foreign powerpacks still delivered relatively low power while demanding large volume.
3. There was limited capability to reduce engine compartment volume with existing tech.

So there was simply too little space to add armor. As you can see, it consisted of a single steel plate above the engine compartment.

The driver received extra protection in the form of a composite armor block. In red above the engine is a composite armor block consisting only a portion of the visible frontal armor, and on the right is a less sloped part in front of the driver station, also with composite armor. Such composite armor was added to Mark 2 and Mark 3 tanks. Mark 1 tanks were largely brought to Merkava 2 standards over the years.

All Merkavas between Mark 1-3 as well as the Namer 1, use several variants of the AVDS-1790 engine.

The Merkava 4 and Namer 2 already use an MTU-883 engine coupled with a Renk 325 transmission. This powerpack was relatively expensive at the time, but came at a form factor suitable for mounting additional frontal armor above it.

As you can see below, the Merkava 4 has thick armor at the hull, which provides the necessary conditions to design an armor package that suits the IDF's needs against modern threats.

Opened engine cover during preparations. 2014

Myth #2: The Added Protection Comes From The Engine Alone

In the late 70's when the Merkava 1 development was finalized, the Merkava was claimed by its creators - primarily decorated general Israel Tal, to be the safest tank in the world, owing to a rather unique design feature of having the engine installed at the front and the placement of ammunition in the rear of the hull. 

It was on one hand a political interest - parents must provide consent to conscripting their child to combat service, and fresh memories of the Yom Kippur War only a few years earlier, gave tanks a negative public perception particularly in terms of survivability. 

But it was equally a factual statement. A range of design decisions have indeed improved the survivability of the crew of a Merkava 1 compared to the IDF's existing Magach (M48, M60), and Sho't (Centurion) that formed the backbone of the IDF's Armored Corps, especially older or less relevant variants like trophy Soviet tanks, Shermans, and their predecessors.

Red bins in the rear are 105mm ammunition

Even though the armor on some areas of the tank was lacking in an absolute sense, the ability of the crew to survive a shot from a contemporary Soviet MBT, would not be diminished. To the contrary. Survivability is not all about armor.

The engine at the front, however, was not the main design feature. In any realistic combat scenario at the time, the turret is the most vulnerable area in armor vs armor battles. And the top is particularly vulnerable in urban combat. Both types of combat were practical scenarios for the IDF at the time and well into the Merkava 4's development.

Minimizing the size of the turret by eliminating stowed ammo above the turret ring, meant the turret was less vulnerable in both scenarios. It also allowed for more sloping and odd shapes on the turret that further increase its protection from many angles, not just the front.

Hence shifting the engine forward meant a range of other design decisions could be implemented to improve protection. The engine, after all, accounted for only one part of the tank's targetable areas, and the least targeted one. 

Over the nearly 50 years, combat footage and records showed:

• Large number of hits/impacts:
• Belly, tracks, sides - from IEDs, mines, and EFPs.
• Sides, top - from RPGs, ATGMs.
  
  
• Low number of hits/impacts or recent incidents:
• Top - from Drones.
• Rear - from RPGs and sticky charges.
• Front - from ATGMs, RPGs.

Yet when transitioning from older foreign designs to the Merkava, and between all variants of Merkava, the survival rates only improved. This shows the IDF correctly calculated its threats and designed its AFVs accordingly in an effective manner.

For example, the forward placement of the engine allows placing the ammo at the very rear, where it is least susceptible to enemy fire. Former General Tal, head of the Merkava development program, regarded this feature as at least equivalent in protective value to the frontally mounted engine.

The turret was accordingly empty of ammo, so that in any frontal engagement, a "catastrophic kill" would be impossible. Of course, times changed and the Merkava 4 already has 10 rounds in a safe stowage in the turret, to meet lethality demands.

Rear ammo racks in Merkava 3

Another noticeable advantage was the ability of the crew to move in and out via the rear hatch, safe from small arms fire and other hazards that would be more threatening to a crew more slowly sliding through a hatch on top of a tank 2-3 meters tall. If the tank was immobilized, pierced, or in any way mission-incapable, the crew would be able to escape safely and live another day. This, knowing that it takes more time and more effort to train a crew than it does to build a single tank, and knowing that crew experience is invaluable.

This also leads us to the next point.

Rear escape hatch weighs 500kg but opened with 1 finger

Myth #3: The Merkava Acts as APC

It may be confusing for some, especially as many have heard the Merkava is capable of transporting troops. However, not everyone is aware that for the Merkava to actually transport troops, it must give up on its task as an MBT, as it is required to dump the entirety of its ammunition (bar the Merkava 3/4 that have very few rounds in the turret) to accommodate more than 1 extra fully geared soldier.

Picked up soldiers may sit in the rear where the ammo canisters are located, by removing and dumping them, but it doesn't make their ride very comfortable. The floor and walls are riddled with spikes which connect the ammo racks to them, making it practically impossible for a soldier to lean on the wall or sit comfortably. In a world where soldiers' wellbeing actually matters, such arrangement is a no-go. It's not that someone's being a crybaby about it. Tanks and APCs are incredibly loud and shaky. Even very modern ones. It's not uncommon for soldiers pick up a lot of back and hearing issues by the end of their service. You could stick a couple guys in such arrangement into the back of a Merkava for a unique, once-in-a-long-time mission. Certainly not on a regular basis.

  

Doesn't seem very comfortable

On the other hand, there have been occasions of the rear corridor being used, both with full ammo and without. 

For example a tank could rear into an infantry position and allow safe entry of a wounded soldier and relatively safe CASEVAC.

Another major benefit of the rear corridor is that it allows a significant boost in comfort and safety in tasks such as resupply, in firing positions, or in ambushes, for example where there is genuine threat of exposed crewmen being picked off. In ambushes it's useful to allow crewmen a better place to rest, and get in and out undetected.

Myth #4: The Merkava is Specialized Against Insurgents

Not only is it untrue, it is exactly the opposite. The Merkava was designed from the very beginning to be the best possible counter to Syrian and Egyptian mechanized assaults coming from the Golan and Sinai, equipped with the latest Soviet tanks and technology. 

Key features such as ammo-free turret, low profile turret, frontal engine, and rear placed hull ammo, and rear escape hatch, are all highly useful in Armored Warfare aka Tank vs Tank engagements, as they help shield the crew and tank itself from frontal hazards.

It doesn't mean the Merkava will lag in counter-insurgency warfare though. It has demonstrated to be a highly adaptable tank, having incorporated a highly modular construction in the Mark 3 and 4 variants which allowed to defend against future threats.

For example, the modular construction allowed to install applique armor on the flanks of Mark 2, 3 and 4 tanks, as well as install an Active Protection System on the Merkava 4M. 

This myth probably comes from the Merkava 4's armor being more balanced all around, and the days of the intifada. 

But the former has only proven to make the Merkava a more effective MBT, as we are now seeing in conflicts worldwide that even peer adversaries would rarely pit, willingly or not, mechanized forces against one another. Even their methods of choice to defeat armor are highly varied, and their own tanks are somewhere at the very bottom of that list. 

Not coincidentally, the Merkava 4 is also heavy, said to start at 65 tons and by 2024 ballooned to ~80 tons. But that is a weight point a lot of modern MBTs are going toward when you install all the necessary kit to provide as close to hemispheric protection as possible.

Regarding the intifada, particularly deployments against lightly armed insurgents in Palestinian territories, that was just one task among many. It can be roughly equated to US and NATO deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Does that make the Abrams, Leopard, Leclerc - specialized against insurgents? Of course not. Not all tanks are made equal, but these and the Merkava are some of the most balanced MBTs today in terms of threat perception and evolution to meet various threats.

Myth #5: The Merkava is Big, Heavy and Therefore Slow

While partially true for the earlier Merkava 1 and 2 tanks, it's far from truth regarding the Mark 3 and Mark 4 tanks.

The early Merkava 1 and Mark 2 had a very poor power to weight ratio due to underpowered engines available at the time. But that metric alone has little meaning. What matters more is how quickly a tank can dash in and out of a firing position, dash away from a threat or a dangerous position, advance to assume new positions, and how well the vehicle can remain mobile under adverse conditions. A tank that drives slower but is less prone to mechanical failures in the drivetrain, may well be considered the more mobile tank. But the Merkavas in service today, Mk3 and Mk4, are not slow either. They can dash quickly despite their weight, and we must remember that their weight was not and is not exceptional relative to contemporary designs. 

The Merkava does make the rather unusual choice of using a helical spring suspension instead of torsion bars, or the more popular nowadays hydropneumatic. There is logic there. The downside is that it's heavier. Torsion bars are lighter, hence many MBTs today use them. Weight requirements in 2025 are not what they were in 1975. Although manufacturers talk about going down to the 50-ton range, hydropneumatic suspension, on the heavier side, is increasingly popular, including in the K2 and Type 10 MBTs, both very light MBTs. Though admittedly, common configurations only include hydropneumatic arms at the front and rear of the tank, not along the entire hull.

But the upside of helical springs is their protective qualities. Being external to the tank, they act as additional armor against various threats from the sides and below. Unlike torsion bars, they do not occupy space at the belly of the tank where typically one must also allocate space for a belly armor kit, not a common consideration in the 70's-80's. 

Additionally, torsion bars have been realized to be a hazard against mines, making them much less attractive today as mine protection demands have only increased over the years and not faded after GWOT.

Torsion bars have a tendency to bend into the tank when a blast occurs underneath. This could potentially send them and dangerous shrapnel toward crewmen.

Spring suspension of Merkava 4 - dual springs

Being able to maneuver with fewer worries is also a factor in mobility.

Switching to a more modern MTU-883 and Renk 325 powerpack in the Mark 4, the Merkava 4 was essentially at a standard power/weight ratio as in contemporary western designs, with modern automotives and a design that allows it to dash quickly across the muddy and rocky Golan, sandy Negev, slopes of the Judea and Samaria area, and various urban terrains in Gaza and J&S. 

I know it was once popular to compare top speeds, but MBTs don't really reach those. Driving an MBT, and any AFV really, is dangerous both to the crew and their surroundings. Tanks can easily overturn on slopes or crash into holes. Very painful experience, sometimes deadly, and not at all convenient in terms of pulling it back up and repairing it. 

Now imagine doing that while going 60km/h. You'll become a smoothie. Not to mention chances of you doing something stupid that hurts yourself or others around you grows exponentially the faster you go. Despite the many measures taken to improve the driver's efficiency, a tank is still a difficult thing to drive. Not good visibility, often reliance on cameras that get dirty or smooshed.

Nice mobility-related anecdote here.

Namer in Gaza

Myth #6: It's a Defensive Tank in Nature, Not Offensive

If I had a penny every time I heard this, I would have like $13. 

There is no such thing as defensive tank or offensive tank. 

MBTs are built for a single purpose - maneuver combat.

They don't just sit in prepared positions all day. Maneuver combat is a complex thing where movement, lethality, and control of the battlespace is key. An MBT of all sorts must be capable of affording its crew sufficient protection against enemy threats, deliver immense direct firepower, move where it needs to move when needed, and ultimately - establish presence. 

There are some MBTs like the Type 10 and K2, or tanks considered light or medium tanks, such as the M10 Booker or Harimau, that have certain constraints, usually logistical, that force them to sacrifice some aspect of classic MBT traits, but this hardly affects their core mission. The Merkava family is not among those. There aren't major constraints on cost, complexity, dimensions, or weight, that could somehow make it a niche vehicle.

Myth #7: It's Tailored For Israel, Not Suitable For Export

Aside from the fact the Merkava has been exported in limited quantity, and negotiations to sell Mark 2 and Mark 3 tanks were only cancelled because of war that drove domestic need, there is no such thing as an AFV that's not suitable for export.

It is true that every AFV manufacturing nation designs its AFVs first and foremost for its own needs. To avoid excessive complexity and receive a viable product, manufacturers also typically initially limit the scope of scenarios to only their nation's needs. 

For example if the US intends to deploy ground forces mostly in Europe, it makes sense to design the Abrams for that. A very snowy country would prefer a solution that prioritizes mobility on snow. A desert country would prefer something that suits hot desert climate and sand.

Does it mean the Abrams is not exportable to or usable in a desert country? Of course not. It's been extensively used in the middle east and exported there. 

Same goes for the Leopard and Leclerc, and most Soviet tank variants, also built for Europe.

K2 built for Korean-specific specs is massively exported to Poland.

The reality is that once the need arises, whether through deployment or export, these AFVs can be adapted without fuss, to their new environment. Sometimes it's just a simple modification. Sometimes it's a larger do-over in more extreme cases.

The K2 sale to Poland includes both Korean-spec K2, and improved K2PL variants preferably with additional top and side armor that would drive up its weight. To cope with Polish demands, South Korea offers a maxed GVW 6 wheel version, or a 7 wheel version to add more weight. Despite such design changes, Poland imported the K2 and plans to modernize it.

Similarly, there is no technical barrier to the Merkava being exported. It's a complex equation involving Israel's own needs, its production capability for exports, what it can offer as part of an export package, the political situation between Israel and a potential buyer, and more generally the supply and demand situation on the tank market. It's a market that spikes every once in a while, then lays dormant.