Conclusions from the 2nd Lebanon War

The 2nd Lebanon War has been a controversial topic for many who showed interest whether in modern armored warfare.
Most of the debate comes down to the performance of the Israel Defense Forces Armored Corps in that war, although the problem was much bigger than that.
The stars of that war were the Merkava tanks on the one side, and Hezbollah AT crews armed with a wide range of ATGMs on the other side.

The rather poor performance of the IDF, as well as the Armored Corps, can be tied to the wrong-perceived reality that the future is in low intensity conflicts that rarely, if at all, include tanks, artillery, and high intensity warfare tactics.

After that war, the IDF has had a total shake-up and is now in perhaps its best condition ever. It prepares for high intensity conflicts at all times, spending peak amounts of money on training, and finances modernization programs in all branches of the military to obtain both greater savings for financing future projects, and relevant capabilities in the modern battlefield.

So now I present you the conclusions the IDF made after the 2006 war that explain in part why the Armored Corps performed poorly, and how it prepared to fix the issue:

Conclusions

1)Command & Control Procedures - Emphasis on Mission and Battle Management

• 26% of tanks hit were operating in non-core missions.
• Partial (incomplete) Combat Procedures preceded 65% of tank hits.
• There was an issue in the clarity of the mission and its understanding in light of the target.
• Frequent unit restructurings caused confusion between the commanders (overburdening in combat procedures to observe).
• Throughout all days of the operation, the organic structure of the unit was broken including within tank units.

2)Tank Operation and Co-Operation

• Tanks were used unprofessionally by the commanders.
• Tanks as an immediate and available asset to the Platoon Commander and Company Commander.
• 62% of tank hit cases were in areas under friendly control.
• 56% of tank hit cases were in missions without any infantry support.
• No "common language" between tank commanders and infantry.
• No opening of logistical lines for replenishment of the tanks.
• Gaps in common techniques with engineering corps (opening lines, mutual recovery, "living space"/camps).
• Few combat vehicles in significant phases of combat.
• Peripheral defense of combat vehicles was poorly executed.
• Inexperienced command, partially due to restructuring.
• Insufficient observation duties.
• Inability to provide logistical support to combat vehicles.
• In 89% of tank hits, no artillery was called up.

3)Drills and Doctrine (Tactics, Techniques, Protocols, Procedures)

• Most drills and procedures were proven relevant.
• Nonetheless, they were quantitatively lacking:
• Fire extinguishing drills insufficient.
• Battle line combat (from entrenched positions) drills unsatisfactory for the set conditions of the war.
• Foot combat drills insufficient.
• Fighter sturdiness, in the context of in-tank staying, insufficient.

• Crew experience in implementing drills is insufficient:
• Handling of AT threats (smoke was not activated in 46% of cases, 94% of tanks hit were static or slow).
• Driving in mountainous areas.
• Carrying and using assault means.
• Activation of track-spreading/tearing IEDs.

4)Weaponry

• Lack of complementary equipment for mechanized warfare: Infantry transportation, command transportation, logistics, and evacuation.
• Lack of weaponry to counter AT threats: Smoke, 60mm mortar, reliable means of missile identification, quick evacuation kits.
• BMS as a power multiplier - updating the forces with a clear picture, common language between branches, and prevention of friendly fire incidents.
• Protection was insufficient (45 tanks were hit by 50 missiles (note: could be translation issue), 23 tanks were pierced and disabled - over 51%).
• 30% of tanks were hit by the first missile.
• 11% of tanks hit have suffered detonation of ammunition.
• A damaged tank creates media resonance that hurts recruitment of reservists and their morale.
• A gap was created in the effective answer for infantry and structures for 120mm cannons.
• Lack of night vision equipment for commanders.
• Lack of mobile comms for dismounting the tank.
• Lack of belly plates - limited numbers in light of increasing threat.

5)Training

• In 47% of hits, there were notable deficiencies in crew performance.
• Training gaps were especially noticeable at the operation beginning, and in units that trained less, or trained procedures outside the tanks.
• Noticeable deficiency in mechanized infantry and recon infantry training alongside tanks.
• Co-operation exercises almost didn't happen.
• Lack of frame-work exercises.
• Co-operation exercises on the battalion level were partially completed, and their focus was not on the in-company cooperation.
• Platoon structure - Platoons that operated in pairs enjoyed swiftness, agility, and increased control. Platoons that operated in threes enjoyed from increased survivability, depth of operation, and wider missions.
• Battalions that did cooperate with the mechanized infantry claimed it to be a real force multiplier in the aspect of tank peripheral security, observation, local infantry combat, and wounded evacuation.

Recommendations

Doctrine - Combined Arms

• Implementation of the existing doctrine on high intensity combat, properly.
• Focusing on close combat techniques and their updating.
• Doctrinal institutionalization of the heavy mechanized combat.
• Effective use of infantry - Finding balance between captured space, and space used for fire and special means.
• Reducing friction in AT-saturated areas.
• Operation of tanks in frame-works.
• Writing techniques for combination of armor and engineering assets.
• New artillery drills for disturbance of a large area, to disrupt AT threats.
• Stability of the pairings even at the cost of optimal matching of the mission scale.
• Strengthening the observation capabilities for opening firing cells (active battle area), from different directions and with varying signatures.

Doctrine - Armored Corps

• Adapting techniques for fighting from prepared positions.
• Checking situations in which on-foot-action should be mixed, and implementing them into the doctrine.
• Setting criteria and drills for abandoning a tank (including fire fighting drills).
• Set up operational perception for deceptive actions.

Weapons

• Develop platforms for auxiliary missions - mobilizing infantry, command, and logistics.
• Determine whether to keep the mortars or scrap them and add smoke mortar shells to the tanks.
• Strengthen the BMS-less tanks with computers that allow quick areal analysis. 
• Test solutions for diverting the ammo explosion out of the fighting compartment.
• Provide solution against the first missile through active protection, jammers, and advanced smoke systems.
• Equip all tanks with 2nd generation smoke systems.
• Develop 120mm round for soft targets.
• Pre-set all firing charts (firing solutions) of all possible rounds into the FCS.
• Create tank-looking dummies and spread them on the battalion level.

Organization

• Determine the tank platoon structure - the necessity of an additional tank in light of the possible threat, needed protection, and additional tasks.
• Accelerate equipment of BMS and provide solution to unique forces (heavy engineering equipment such as bulldozers).
• Test organizations of specialized companies (spearhead, breach etc etc). In light of lack of means and need in specialty.
• Return the means of smoke-screening to the tanks.
• Organic infantry / Mechanized infantry - the topic is currently handled by the HQ.
• Provide mobile comms to tanks (for dismounted operation).
• There is need is setting up a geological-operational body that will assist commanders in opening lines.
• Reconsider the ammo setup considering the types of targets and to minimize threat to the crew.

Debate

• Long Range Movement - Other than a select few places, no combat movement exceeded several kilometers at a time.
• Protection - A threat that minimizes the strengths of the tank and amplifies its weaknesses (Fighting in the "Grinding Mill" area, lack of artillery and kinetic threat, AT as a main threat and lack of protection means). 

Note: By "Grinding Mill" they mean an open area where tanks are exposed from many directions, and are targeted by concealed targets well spread out, typically in an ambush, with an overwhelming amount of firepower.

• Firepower - Inefficient use of firepower due to excessive forces in the maneuvering area, problematic cooperation, and "wealth" of special fire.
• Breathing space - No breathing space for the combat vehicles due to lack of logistical lines.
• Overcoming natural obstacles - Done, but requires improvement and specialized techniques.
• Exploiting power - Activation of parts of frameworks, hardships in concentrating efforts, and inefficient combined arms.

Summary

1. To complete the wide range of missions, the combined arms needs to balance between the "light" capabilities and "heavy" capabilities as a function of the characteristics of the combat situation, and constraints.
2. The heavy maneuvering was done in a very partial and incomplete way.
3. As for the light maneuvering:

• Fighting area was fairly limited.
• Low signature enemy.
• "Wealth" of artillery and special means (alternatives to tanks).
• Ability to compensate for the lack of heavy maneuvering through aerial supply and evacuation.
• Fighting in comfortable weather conditions.

             All these created the illusion that most of the missions could be completed through light                       maneuvering alone.

The text was translated directly from the "Shiryon" (Armor) magazine:

Shiryon magazine, Issue 50.