Conclusions from the 2nd Lebanon War

The 2nd Lebanon War has been a controversial topic for many who showed interest whether in modern armored warfare.
Most of the debate comes down to the performance of the Israel Defense Forces Armored Corps in that war, although the problem was much bigger than that.
The stars of that war were the Merkava tanks on the one side, and Hezbollah AT crews armed with a wide range of ATGMs on the other side.

The rather poor performance of the IDF, as well as the Armored Corps, can be tied to the wrong-perceived reality that the future is in low intensity conflicts that rarely, if at all, include tanks, artillery, and high intensity warfare tactics.

After that war, the IDF has had a total shake-up and is now in perhaps its best condition ever. It prepares for high intensity conflicts at all times, spending peak amounts of money on training, and finances modernization programs in all branches of the military to obtain both greater savings for financing future projects, and relevant capabilities in the modern battlefield.

So now I present you the conclusions the IDF made after the 2006 war that explain in part why the Armored Corps performed poorly, and how it prepared to fix the issue:

Conclusions

1)Command & Control Procedures - Emphasis on Mission and Battle Management

• 26% of tanks hit were operating in non-core missions.
• Partial (incomplete) Combat Procedures preceded 65% of tank hits.
• There was an issue in the clarity of the mission and its understanding in light of the target.
• Frequent unit restructurings caused confusion between the commanders (overburdening in combat procedures to observe).
• Throughout all days of the operation, the organic structure of the unit was broken including within tank units.

2)Tank Operation and Co-Operation

• Tanks were used unprofessionally by the commanders.
• Tanks as an immediate and available asset to the Platoon Commander and Company Commander.
• 62% of tank hit cases were in areas under friendly control.
• 56% of tank hit cases were in missions without any infantry support.
• No "common language" between tank commanders and infantry.
• No opening of logistical lines for replenishment of the tanks.
• Gaps in common techniques with engineering corps (opening lines, mutual recovery, "living space"/camps).
• Few combat vehicles in significant phases of combat.
• Peripheral defense of combat vehicles was poorly executed.
• Inexperienced command, partially due to restructuring.
• Insufficient observation duties.
• Inability to provide logistical support to combat vehicles.
• In 89% of tank hits, no artillery was called up.

3)Drills and Doctrine (Tactics, Techniques, Protocols, Procedures)

• Most drills and procedures were proven relevant.
• Nonetheless, they were quantitatively lacking:
• Fire extinguishing drills insufficient.
• Battle line combat (from entrenched positions) drills unsatisfactory for the set conditions of the war.
• Foot combat drills insufficient.
• Fighter sturdiness, in the context of in-tank staying, insufficient.

• Crew experience in implementing drills is insufficient:
• Handling of AT threats (smoke was not activated in 46% of cases, 94% of tanks hit were static or slow).
• Driving in mountainous areas.
• Carrying and using assault means.
• Activation of track-spreading/tearing IEDs.

4)Weaponry

• Lack of complementary equipment for mechanized warfare: Infantry transportation, command transportation, logistics, and evacuation.
• Lack of weaponry to counter AT threats: Smoke, 60mm mortar, reliable means of missile identification, quick evacuation kits.
• BMS as a power multiplier - updating the forces with a clear picture, common language between branches, and prevention of friendly fire incidents.
• Protection was insufficient (45 tanks were hit by 50 missiles (note: could be translation issue), 23 tanks were pierced and disabled - over 51%).
• 30% of tanks were hit by the first missile.
• 11% of tanks hit have suffered detonation of ammunition.
• A damaged tank creates media resonance that hurts recruitment of reservists and their morale.
• A gap was created in the effective answer for infantry and structures for 120mm cannons.
• Lack of night vision equipment for commanders.
• Lack of mobile comms for dismounting the tank.
• Lack of belly plates - limited numbers in light of increasing threat.

5)Training

• In 47% of hits, there were notable deficiencies in crew performance.
• Training gaps were especially noticeable at the operation beginning, and in units that trained less, or trained procedures outside the tanks.
• Noticeable deficiency in mechanized infantry and recon infantry training alongside tanks.
• Co-operation exercises almost didn't happen.
• Lack of frame-work exercises.
• Co-operation exercises on the battalion level were partially completed, and their focus was not on the in-company cooperation.
• Platoon structure - Platoons that operated in pairs enjoyed swiftness, agility, and increased control. Platoons that operated in threes enjoyed from increased survivability, depth of operation, and wider missions.
• Battalions that did cooperate with the mechanized infantry claimed it to be a real force multiplier in the aspect of tank peripheral security, observation, local infantry combat, and wounded evacuation.

Recommendations

Doctrine - Combined Arms

• Implementation of the existing doctrine on high intensity combat, properly.
• Focusing on close combat techniques and their updating.
• Doctrinal institutionalization of the heavy mechanized combat.
• Effective use of infantry - Finding balance between captured space, and space used for fire and special means.
• Reducing friction in AT-saturated areas.
• Operation of tanks in frame-works.
• Writing techniques for combination of armor and engineering assets.
• New artillery drills for disturbance of a large area, to disrupt AT threats.
• Stability of the pairings even at the cost of optimal matching of the mission scale.
• Strengthening the observation capabilities for opening firing cells (active battle area), from different directions and with varying signatures.

Doctrine - Armored Corps

• Adapting techniques for fighting from prepared positions.
• Checking situations in which on-foot-action should be mixed, and implementing them into the doctrine.
• Setting criteria and drills for abandoning a tank (including fire fighting drills).
• Set up operational perception for deceptive actions.

Weapons

• Develop platforms for auxiliary missions - mobilizing infantry, command, and logistics.
• Determine whether to keep the mortars or scrap them and add smoke mortar shells to the tanks.
• Strengthen the BMS-less tanks with computers that allow quick areal analysis. 
• Test solutions for diverting the ammo explosion out of the fighting compartment.
• Provide solution against the first missile through active protection, jammers, and advanced smoke systems.
• Equip all tanks with 2nd generation smoke systems.
• Develop 120mm round for soft targets.
• Pre-set all firing charts (firing solutions) of all possible rounds into the FCS.
• Create tank-looking dummies and spread them on the battalion level.

Organization

• Determine the tank platoon structure - the necessity of an additional tank in light of the possible threat, needed protection, and additional tasks.
• Accelerate equipment of BMS and provide solution to unique forces (heavy engineering equipment such as bulldozers).
• Test organizations of specialized companies (spearhead, breach etc etc). In light of lack of means and need in specialty.
• Return the means of smoke-screening to the tanks.
• Organic infantry / Mechanized infantry - the topic is currently handled by the HQ.
• Provide mobile comms to tanks (for dismounted operation).
• There is need is setting up a geological-operational body that will assist commanders in opening lines.
• Reconsider the ammo setup considering the types of targets and to minimize threat to the crew.

Debate

• Long Range Movement - Other than a select few places, no combat movement exceeded several kilometers at a time.
• Protection - A threat that minimizes the strengths of the tank and amplifies its weaknesses (Fighting in the "Grinding Mill" area, lack of artillery and kinetic threat, AT as a main threat and lack of protection means). 

Note: By "Grinding Mill" they mean an open area where tanks are exposed from many directions, and are targeted by concealed targets well spread out, typically in an ambush, with an overwhelming amount of firepower.

• Firepower - Inefficient use of firepower due to excessive forces in the maneuvering area, problematic cooperation, and "wealth" of special fire.
• Breathing space - No breathing space for the combat vehicles due to lack of logistical lines.
• Overcoming natural obstacles - Done, but requires improvement and specialized techniques.
• Exploiting power - Activation of parts of frameworks, hardships in concentrating efforts, and inefficient combined arms.

Summary

1. To complete the wide range of missions, the combined arms needs to balance between the "light" capabilities and "heavy" capabilities as a function of the characteristics of the combat situation, and constraints.
2. The heavy maneuvering was done in a very partial and incomplete way.
3. As for the light maneuvering:

• Fighting area was fairly limited.
• Low signature enemy.
• "Wealth" of artillery and special means (alternatives to tanks).
• Ability to compensate for the lack of heavy maneuvering through aerial supply and evacuation.
• Fighting in comfortable weather conditions.

             All these created the illusion that most of the missions could be completed through light                       maneuvering alone.

The text was translated directly from the "Shiryon" (Armor) magazine:

Shiryon magazine, Issue 50.

Eitan and new years' update

It's been a while since news came about any major development in AFVs in Israel. We're kept in the dark for now, about the artillery project, which seems to be delayed until inspection by the MoD is finished regarding corruption allegations.

Eitan

• Costs half the price of a Namer.
• Costs 1/10th the engine-time of a Namer.
• Reached well over 100km/h on trials but may be limited to 60km/h in transportation mode as it's expected to drive on highways in emergency time rather than on HETs (Heavy Equipment Transporters). But the speed governor could also be removed when needed.
• MANTAK will present this month its recommendations for an APS for the Eitan - Iron Fist or Trophy, a decision said to be worth hundreds of millions of shekels (Every Trophy system costs 1 million shekels roughly, which is 300,000 USD).
• ERA as well as the passive composite armor are said to be sufficient against current threats.
• 3 screens are located inside the vehicle - 2 large "21 screens for the commander and driver, and 1 smaller one by the rear door.
• Engine could come from either MTU or Caterpillar.
• Initial operation capability in 2019.

What this means

• For now a total of 500 Namers are planned. Some in service and some in production, albeit slow one. For the same price as another 500 (originally the IDF wanted 800 or more), over 1000 Eitans could be acquired which makes them more open to auxiliary duties such as mortar carriage, repair and maintenance, recovery and more, where the Namer would be too expensive. And since these duties require no turret and no APS, it could cost even 1/3rd as much as the Namer.

• Training a battalion worth of Namers would cost as much as 3 brigades of Eitans. Impressive savings, but these can be attributed probably to the fact the Namer's engine is the old AVDS-1790 which in its early iterations served the Patton tanks.

• No comment here, other than it being odd that they just gave it a top speed of 90km/h at first when it could do well over that. Previously they gave it a governed speed of 50km/h I believe, which now changed to 60km/h. Perhaps some automotive improvements they didn't disclose.

• This is a big one - we were promised way back in 2014 that RAFAEL and IMI will set aside their former rivalry in this exact topic but it seems now that the next generation of APS will no longer be a combination of both their systems, and rather would be another competition between the two. I don't know yet whether this is good or bad, but I do feel some disappointment.

• When talking about the Eitan, the military officials and media always refer to just one incident - the Shujaiya (Gaza) rocket attack that killed 7 men in an M113 troops transporter. The rocket was an RPG-29 (PG-29V). So if the IDF claims the Eitan can, without an APS, resist the RPG-29, then by all means this is an impressive feat. Generous claims are for 600mm penetration after ERA, and 750mm without ERA, which is quite substantial.

• Just like the Merkava 4, but unlike the Namer, the Eitan will have the BMS Tzayad (Hunter, marketed by Elbit as Torch) integrated into the main computer, laying everything on one screen in front of the commander. Though judging by the photos below alone, it's not yet obvious where the gunner's display is.

• Which probably means that an electric or hybrid engine is now off the table. The available offerings right now are: C18 and 6V 890

Eitan

Namer

And for the first time in ever, the IDF released some statistics on its acquisition this year. It's not much, actually not enough even, but it's something. 

The short list

The only two important bits are that the Merkava 4 and Namer are both produced at a rate of 30 vehicles per year, each. This makes sense for the Namer, which is due to have the 500th unit delivered by 2027, which means today there are ~200 units, but that's a really low number. At peak production, the plant could produce 120 Merkava tanks a year. And that was more than 30 years ago.

And that's it for today!

Source:

https://www.yediot.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5066561,00.html?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=yediot%2520page&utm_campaign=facebook%2520page

Namer as LAND 400 Phase 3 contender

Monthly Australian defense outlet DefenceTechnologyReview has since the beginning of the Australian LAND 400 program, held a monopoly over information on the program, and perhaps other parallel programs that are part of Australia's recent push to modernize its equipment across all domains.

You can find their digital journal here: https://dtrmagazine.com/

LAND 400 is a program that is set to bring the Australian Army renewed capabilities in the form of a wheeled Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles (CRV) in the 2nd phase of the program (1st phase was for requirement setting), and tracked IFVs in the 3rd phase, to replace the ASLAV and M113 platforms (respectively) currently in service, which are considered obsolete.

Phase 2 is already in an advanced stage, and two last contenders were downselected: Patria's AMV35 with an E35 turret, and the Boxer A2 with a Lance turret.
Phase 3 has yet to begin, but is closely related to the Phase 2 as it favors a bidder who integrates the same turret as the Phase 2 winner. Although commonality is a trait sought after by every armed forces as of long ago, it harms the competitive nature of the program as the winner of the 2nd phase will have a strong edge in the 3rd phase. Finding an optimal solution would be difficult. It is possible to award each competitor enough money to do integration works of the winner's turret in the 2nd phase, but the bidder who won in the 2nd phase will have the edge of smaller expenses.
This directly relates to the Namer IFV.

Namer recently tested with new turret, turning it into an IFV

Currently, the Puma from KMW, Lynx KF-41 from Rheinmetall, and CV9035 from BAE are expected to participate in the 3rd phase of the LAND 400 program. They all have commonality with the 2nd phase.
The Namer will be a an odd ball among them.

Introduction to Namer

Since the mid-90's the concept of utilizing a Merkava chassis for an APC was considered. A Merkava 1 was to be re-engineered to fit a squad of infantry in a special compartment. In 2004, the then-concept got a push and turned into an active program. This was due to what is known as the "APC disaster" (plural), when 2 M113 APCs (named Zelda in Israel) were destroyed with cheap AT weapons, and the fighters inside died. Footage of soldiers searching through the sand for remains of the deceased soldiers were deeply embedded into the public's memory.

In 2005 a prototype was shown, and in 2006 the program got another kick because of the lessons learned in the 2nd Lebanon War, as Hezbollah utilized highly powerful AT missiles/rockets such as Kornet-E, Metis-M, Toophan (Iranian copies of TOW), RPG-29 and more.

Namer prototype on Merkava 1 chassis. Notice flat sides.

In 2008 the production began, but so far only 1 brigade was equipped with the Namer, due to budget cuts. This means most of the IDF's front-line units are still equipped with either Achzarit or M113 APCs. Production was ground to a halt at some point, but currently the rate of production is said to be at 30 vehicles per year, and possibly doubled since the 2014 operation in Gaza. An estimated 600 vehicles are planned overall, and this is supported by the current contract given to RAFAEL and Elta in the sum of 1,041 Million NIS, or ~$300 million, solely for Trophy APS systems for Merkava 3 and 4 tanks, Namer APC/CEV/IFVs, and Eitans. The contract is due to end in 2027 and started in 2016.
In 2007 the cost of a single Trophy system was estimated at $300,000, which means that even if costs hadn't reduced, and they have, roughly 1,000 systems can be procured.
Of course, development costs are also included in this contract, but even if half the sum is utilized for acquisition, it's still an impressive number of front-line units that can be practically immune to a whole range of AT weapons.

In 2009 two Namer vehicles were tested in combat in Operation Cast Lead, and in 2014 already operated on a brigade level. They proved their worth against all threats found in Gaza, against the Hamas-employed Kornet missiles, RPG-29 rockets, and heavy IEDs that usually weighed hundreds of kilograms.
RPGs of various sorts, unknown whether tandem warheads or not, were used to no effect against the Namer, which proved to be invulnerable all around.
In another incident, the Namer reportedly took a Kornet missile to the side. The missile was said to have pierced the armor, but the crew and troop compartment remained uncompromised and none was injured. It leaves room for thought as to what was meant when they said the armor was pierced.
Perhaps more remarkably, the Namer drove beside a multiple story building which was booby-trapped with an IED that reportedly weighed well over a ton. The Namer was hit by the sheer force of the blast and had the building collapse on it, however again none was harmed.

In 2015 the Namer CEV was unveiled in 3 sub-variants aimed to replace the Centurion-based Puma CEV currently in service. It featured among other things increased internal capacity for a tenth passenger.

The Namer CEV was the first to feature a Trophy APS

In 2017 the Namer IFV was finally unveiled with a 30mm turret, featuring also a 60mm mortar, dual Spike missile launchers, and a Trophy APS already integrated. The idea of having a 30mm turret on it was experimented with for over half a decade, but budget cuts delayed it until now.

Another program that was in the running was replacement of the 1,200hp AVDS-1790-9AR from the Merkava 3 with the 1,500hp GD883 (previously MTU883) engine of the Merkava 4, which other than being more compact and lighter, is more powerful. However the GD883 also costs about 3 times as much as the AVDS does, while not offering a significant enough leap in power, thus the program was eventually muted and possibly cancelled.

Advantages of the Namer

Protection

Its protection level is higher than that of an MBT. The 22 tons saved by removing the turret were re-invested in armor protection over the already well protected hull. 

Built in Israel, the Namer doesn't follow NATO protection standards and suits everything to its needs, thus it is impossible to assess its actual protection in numbers. However, its front is similarly armored to the Merkava 4, which makes it capable of taking hits from high caliber cannons such as 120mm and 125mm guns firing modern munitions. 

Its sides are protected by thick slabs of passive and reactive armor, giving it an excellent and wider frontal arc compared to other APCs/IFVs, allowing it to take large caliber fire over a wider arc, and likely providing sufficient protection to make it immune to medium caliber fire, which most opt to have only the front protected against.

Against IEDs, its sheer weight of 60 to 63 tons (depending on variant) together with a thick belly plate and V-shaped hull, will make it a tough nut to crack. Higher weight translates to less noise, which then translates to fewer injuries. 

To further enhance its protection, the Namer is fitted with laser warning systems, automatically deployed smoke systems, and the Trophy APS which is a force multiplier for every vehicle.

The Namer, even without APS, however, is by far the most well protected vehicle in the competition, and probably the most well protected ground vehicle currently in service anywhere.

The second most well protected vehicle in the competition is the Puma IFV, weighing 43 tons. The Puma officially provides protection in accordance to level 6 of STANAG 4569 on the sides, through the use of ERA, and above that on the front. How much above that? Not known, but likely not too much.

The difference is quite high.

Firepower

It is the sole vehicle guaranteed to use the Trophy so far, and the Trophy has a unique feature to it - Slew to Cue. Upon detection of a threat by the Trophy system, the source of fire is located and the gunner can choose to slew the gun onto the target automatically, then fire the gun after the gun has been laid by the Trophy system.

It provides a boost to situational awareness by locating targets at a high rate, and closing the firing loop much more quickly, a vital aspect that is usually overlooked.
Kinetically, it's not too far from the front runners of the Phase 2 program. It sports the same Spike LR 2 missiles that are most likely to be chosen by Australia.
It also has a 60mm mortar which might be advantageous, but the downside is that Australia may not have, or even want to develop a doctrine for its use, i.e want to use it at all.

Integration

Having the Trophy integrated saves time and integration funds, and gives an edge in the lengthy process of the program. Same goes for the integration work of Spike LR 2 missiles, although it can use any existing Spike CLU if available information is correct.

Disadvantages of the Namer

Mobility

Being a 60 ton behemoth is no easy deal when you're expected to maintain a level of tactical and strategic mobility. 

Transporting them across the vast Australia will prove a fuel consuming journey similar to moving around Abrams MBTs.
Add to that the fuel consumption of the vehicles themselves and not merely the transporters, and you get a potentially expensive vehicle to operate.

Firepower

It currently features a 30mm cannon, whereas the competition uses 35mm cannons, so a 35mm cannon has to be integrated. RAFAEL and Elbit usually state their turrets can accommodate larger cannons (than 30mm) but the Namer's turret is made by MANTAK, a military institute and thus it's unknown how many provisions for improvement were given to this turret. 

Elbit ATMOS partially fails demonstration

"Globes", an Israeli economy-centric news outlet who has in the past few months been the only source of information on the development of the IDF's future cannon artillery, and has taken a firm stance against MAFAT's conduct of selecting a single supplier in an allegedly flawed bid, now reports about a failed demonstration.

Elbit's ATMOS - The artillery piece intended for the IDF will be fundamentally different, and Elbit refused to show the prototype to the public.

Elbit's howitzer was said to have been demonstrated and tested twice at least. Once a month ago, and the other 2 weeks ago. The demonstration in the past month was said to be very successful, but we do not yet know how much of the system's capabilities were demonstrated, and whether or not certain parts were left out for later tests.
What we do know is that in at least one occasion, the automatic loading system has failed, and led to halting the demonstration.

Sources inform "Globes" that the trial of the new ATMOS cannon selected by the Ministry of Defense at the end of a controversial procedure was halted. Some of the capabilities of its automatic loading system were not demonstrated at all to representatives of the Ministry of Defense Administration for the Development of Weapons and Technological Infrastructure and IDF artillery corps officers.

This is not something extraordinary. Things like this happen, especially in the rather short schedule Elbit is working on. 

Elbit failed to comment on the issue, but a "source" in the IDF relevant to this topic has said the issue has been fixed.

Something else, however, is disturbing - the IDF has yet to showcase the new artillery piece.

The Eitan, Namer + CEV, Carmel, were all shown to the public in one way or another before testing begun (in case of the Carmel, a 3D render). The Eitan's first prototype was built about a year before it was shown, but even then it was defined to the public in an appropriate way.

The ATMOS is not so much. Actually, we can't really call it an ATMOS, because we know it will be fundamentally different and acquire a Hebrew name, but we don't know just HOW different it will be.

It could be based on a truck. It could be based on an Eitan, or it could be based on the Namer (a hybrid of the Merkava 4 and 3). It could even be based on an independent and specially designed platform like the Rascal was, for all we know.

But what this means is probably that the IDF itself doesn't yet know what they want from this new howitzer other than the parameters they set for the turret.

Strangely, Elbit are also declining to show the turret prototype, and have maintained this stance since at least April when it was acknowledged a prototype was already built.

Source

http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-elbit-atmos-artillery-performs-disappointingly-in-trial-1001203583

Namer IFV w/ 30mm Turret

In January this year, with great excitement I reported on the planned testing of a turret on the Namer, and today, July 31st. it finally arrived.
The turret is not an off-the-shelf design, but dedicated for the needs of the Israeli ground army.


 

Background

For years, a "war" has been raging on whether the Namer should have a turret. Both in defense related forums and defense analysis companies, and within the IDF's multiple branches related to the topic. The "Turret" camp has won, and rightfully so.

This turret is designed not just for the Namer, but for the Eitan wheeled combat vehicle as well. It was also said that in the future, the Carmel tracked vehicle will be armed with a similar 30/40mm cannon in its Combat Support Vehicle variant.

Namer with Samson 30 Mk 1 turret by RAFAEL

Features

It's very clear that this turret is not like anything I've seen before, because it has a very distinct feature of having a turret-mounted APS, not as applique but integrated into it.
Work was not finalized on it, and it may see some additions in the future in the form of an RWS and IronVision system.

At the moment, we're seeing a wide but low profile turret with a 30mm cannon. In an unconventional setup, the missile launchers are set at the rear, folded down, rather than the sides. The ammo capacity itself is also rather large, with 400 rounds, although it is unknown how many are ready to fire, and how many are in storage.

1)It is equipped with a powerful array of optics. Elbit has a long record of supplying top of the line FCS (Fire Control System) and optics to the IDF through its subsidiary El-Op, who won its first Israel Defense Prize in 1997 for creating the Baz FCS for the Merkava 3 tank.

Elbit's COAPS sight, same as the one used on Singapore's Leopard 2 EVO tanks. It appears the gunner's sight is a static version of the COAPS.

 2)Geared with Trophy HV Active Protection System, similar to the one fielded on Merkava 4M tanks and Namer CEV. The difference between this one and the CEV which already rolls with a Trophy system, is that this one is turret-mounted, and does it as an integrated system rather than applique.
Certain applications of APS on existing vehicles require mounting the APS on the hull, as it would otherwise be impossible on the turret without reaching tremendous costs, or breaching the upper limit of capabilities of the turret systems.

An APS is an immensely valuable asset on every vehicle, and is currently revolutionizing ground combat vehicles in multiple countries such as the US's MAPS effort which currently seeks an off-the-shelf system before going into a self-developed one, and Russia's Afghanit.

Training Trophy munitions in ready position.

3)Unfortunately it currently does not possess an Iron Vision system. It was hinted very vaguely that it might get it, but at the moment I'll just list it as a possibility. What indicates this is the lack of external sighting systems dedicated for that system. The COAPS cannot be used for that purpose as it is a rotating system, and the Iron Vision's application (at least 2 users per vehicle) requires a special static panoramic sight, to feed different footage to two recipients via one sight system.

However, the Eitan was said to eventually have this system by its production (in 2020, or earlier), and it is now also said that the Namer's new turret was designed for the Eitan as well, not just for the Namer.

Note the "clean" turret top

4)Something rather unexpected that caught my eye was the mortar. Yep, the iconic Merkava's feature of having a 60mm light mortar in its roof was copied into the new turret. That definitely testifies on what its operators and MANTAK as a whole think of the mortar's contributions throughout its very long service. It lays smoke at day, illuminates at night, marks targets with colored smoke, or fires HE on concealed targets to avoid exposing the vehicle. What is there not to love?

I believe it's not just a lovely gesture, but some original thinking. And although not new, it adds a new level of support the Namer can provide to its infantry. It could lay smoke for them, serve as artillery pocket for them, or the commander could even mark specific targets for them if they're not currently watching the BMS or have difficulty with precision spotting.

Mortar visible on the left side. This is reminiscent of the Merkava which houses a 60mm mortar on every variant.

5)Spike LR II missiles. They are located at the rear section in the center below a hatch and in a dual launcher.
The Spike is known for its ability to conduct precision strikes in manual guidance. This capability is further enhanced in the Spike LR II missile. It is not yet known whether it is indeed the Spike LR II missile, but judging by its schedule for production in 2018, and the Israeli Army's wish to equip its units with it, it would only make sense to use the new one.
Retracting on my previous claim, the missiles could be a great addition to the vehicle. Not because of its ability to defeat tanks, even advanced ones equipped with APS, but because of its precision strike and supportive capabilities for the infantry around the Namer.
It will be nay useless against Hamas in the Gaza strip, where the Namer will be positioned very close to the infantry, but it will shine in a hybrid warfare scenario against Hezbollah, where infantry will deploy a certain distance from the targets, and allow the Namer to use its array of weaponry from a distance while the infantry are advancing at their own pace.

Hatch for elevating dual missile launcher

Conclusion

This is an amazing improvement. Ad-hoc formations using infantry and armor from various brigades to create new "brigades" (or battalion-sized formations) were common practice, to provide battle taxis with strong firepower. Now, Namer formations can be independent in terms of firepower, and can also act as mechanized infantry thus attached to armored units. In the era of information and big data, data management is important and having to improvise on a regular basis is bad. 

The infantry will be less reliant on artillery and air power, and won't have to wait for armor whenever they have to deal with heavily fortified enemies that are out of reach for MATADOR rockets, or too numerous.

As for the turret itself, its rather unorthodox conceptual design brings about several improvements that are not entirely abundant.
Other than providing the infantry with active protection, it can support them with an exceptional and diverse array of weapons, that do anything from direct engagement, precision engagement, to artillery work, all within immediate reach for the squad commander via direct comms to the vehicle commander.

Bonus - Eitan

Eitan To Enter Service Soon / UGV Update

In a rather odd turnout, it seems the Eitan 8x8 wheeled combat vehicle will enter initial service in 2018, and not 2020 as initially envisioned.

There are several reasons to doubt this, but if true, it raises a few questions.
First, there had been no sight of a Trophy-equipped Eitan prototype. Nor a sign of a turret. Which begs the question; If they intend to start equipping infantry units with it this year, the trials with the Trophy and 30mm turret should have been underway.

For the first time, a photo of the interior was shown.

Demonstration of the 360° sighting capability

It also begs the question; where is the IronVision? A typical IronVision system would include at least 2 helmets and a sensor block on the roof. Both are absent, therefore it is possible that the Eitan will first enter service without all its key technologies - Trophy, IronVision, and a 30mm turret. 

It could help to reduce reliance on the M113, but they would eventually require refitting work for all those systems, unless they will only serve temporarily in the infantry brigades and will be later passed down for utility, which would then also require some refitting works. 

I remind that the Eitan is part of the Rakiya project which encompasses the Carmel tracked vehicle as well. Rakiya project commenced in 2012, and work on the Eitan wheeled vehicle commenced in 2014.

UGV Update

Works in the IDF on UGVs continue at a high pace, and a new UGV based on a HMMWV was displayed, with an autonomous driving capability and with a current limited range of 3km from operating station, to be extended later.

An Oshkosh truck (HEMMT) will also be demonstrated with the same capability in September this year.

With news that the Barak MBT based on the Merkava 4 will have its first prototype ready and in trials this year already, the possibility of an unmanned HMMWV being one of the Barak's tools along with retired M113, is growing, and it serves as a tremendous and highly mobile arsenal of expendable vehicles.

First anti-APS weapon: Spike LR II

Almost 9 years ago, in August 2009, something special happened. The first APS entered mass-service. Merkava 4M tanks equipped with the Trophy Active Protection System (named ASPRO-A in Rafael's portfolio), have become the standard production version of the Merkava family of tanks, and as of 2016 the Namer APCs have also joined this happy APS-equipped family.
Of course, the Trophy wasn't the first APS to be fielded in active units, and not even the first to be combat-tested, as that title definitely goes to the Soviet Drozd, fitted to T-55 and T-62 (named T-55D and T-62D respectively) in the early 80's.
The Drozd was rather primitive. It only covered a limited arc of 60°, couldn't track fast objects beyond 700m/s (although believed to be able to track faster objects than stated by manufacturer), and proved to be too dangerous for surrounding infantry, thus it was abandoned and never entered mass-service, and the outfitted tanks were sent to permanent storage.

Drozd APS utilized 4 tubes per side, covering a total of 60° in its earliest variant

Since the 80's, APS have come a very long way. From covering only 60° on the horizontal plain, no vertical protection, and primarily subsonic munition defeat, to cover a full sphere around the vehicle and intercept even hypersonic munitions.

The Threat

Now, of course, the Merkava 4M and Namer are not the only ones to tout an APS as a key asset in their protection suite. The US is now advancing quickly in its MAPS and interim APS solution programs by testing Trophy HV on the Abrams, and Iron Fist-LC on the Bradley, with the Stryker likely going with Artis' Iron Curtain.

The Abrams, for some reason, was rendered without its armor. We can see Trophy HV on Abrams and Iron Fist LC on Bradley

In December 2016 the Netherlands have also announced plans to acquire Iron Fist APS for their fleet of CV9035NL vehicles.

And perhaps the most central piece to my article today is Russia's push towards APS, and it's a serious push.

Unveiled to the public in May 2015, several new vehicles families appeared and signaled a major shift in Russian standards for land gear procurement. Russia abandoned, for the most part, most vehicle projects that commenced during the days of the Soviet Union and moved forward with a new philosophy. 

Now, the Armata family which includes the T-14, T-15, and T-16, the Kurganets family with the Kurganets-25 IFV and APC variants, Boomerang family with K-16 APC and K-17 IFV, are all going to be fitted with the Afghanit APS. Only a few years after mass-production for all these vehicles commenced, Russia will be able to take pride in a huge fleet of ground vehicles protected with an APS, a technology that is only beginning to revolutionize ground warfare.

5 Afghanit tubes embedded onto the turret of the T-14 tank

The Solution

So how can this suddenly appearing threat be properly met? The first country to admit taking this matter very seriously, is Norway.
Norway is now looking to replace its relatively new and modern Javelin anti-tank missile systems with a new weapon capable of penetrating APS defenses. They're looking for at least 100 systems with a total program cost of 200-350 million NOK (23-40 million dollars).
This comes almost immediately before Rafael, developer of the world renowned Spike missile, has announced the existence of the Spike LR II missile, which brings the Spike from 3rd and 4th generation into the 5th generation realm, which has so far only been inhabited by the MBDA MMP missile.

Spike LR II will enter production in 2018 and is a 5th Generation missile

Interestingly, the Spike LR II has already secured a first order, which together with Norway's announcement of its future acquisition program may hint that Norway is the first customer. Time will tell.

I will not go into detail about the Spike LR II, other than just mentioning that it is 10% lighter, penetrates 30% more, and flies 38% farther.
More can be found here (link).

The one feature that really deserves mentioning is the Spike LR II's ability to dive at a very steep angle of 70°. 

This does not really bother systems like the Trophy HV, Iron Fist, or Iron Curtain that the US, Netherlands, Israel, and Australia are fielding or plan on fielding. (ADS is also being considered in Australia's case), as these are all providing hemispheric protection that will have no trouble defeating such ATGM. However, Russia's Afghanit APS does not provide hemispheric protection, nor full rounded protection, and only protects on the horizontal plain, therefore it is vulnerable to such an ATGM.

The Afghanit borrows its concept from the Drozd system which I shortly described earlier. 

Drozd was capable of hitting with its tube-launched grenades, targets that were ~30° elevated or depressed relative to the tank's center-line, therefore we can assume the Afghanit can do the same.

With enhanced fragmentation and proper programming, it could probably be increased to 40°. Considering that, Spike missiles could evade the Afghanit with a Fire & Steer mode of operation, but that would require both a higher level of skill in operating the missile, and to constantly man the missile launch unit until the missile hits the target.

What the Spike LR II allows is to guarantee a hit on the top of the tank, where it is completely uncovered, without anyone manning the missile in a complete Fire & Forget mode.

Just Temporary

As I have mentioned above, only the Afghanit seems to be vulnerable to this system, as the Spike LR II uses a high angle of attack to exploit the Afghanit's large dead zone.

Russia has taken delivery of RPG-30 rockets, with the unique feature of a dummy warhead located in a separate small tube, which is fired before the real rocket is fired as a type of precursor. The precursor dummy round is supposed to activate the APS, leaving it unprepared to deal with the real rocket coming in right behind it. However, due to its concept of operation, and according to Rafael press releases, the RPG-30 remains largely ineffective against the Trophy, and was said to actually be developed to counter the Drozd and Arena systems, which may imply that the Afghanit is also vulnerable to decoys.

Precursor can be seen on the right tube

In order to defeat decoys, all that is needed is a 3D radar that will determine the shape and size of the projectile and classify it as either potentially dangerous or not, so the RPG-30 is ultimately a nice but failed concept.

Other APS systems that are currently fielded or will be fielded in western armies, are immune to top attack munitions, even those going down completely vertically on target, and it seems that for now, the theoretical solution to APS will be merely fire saturation.

End Result

It seems that despite the Spike LR II merely taking advantage of a dead zone of the Afghanit APS, NATO will have a strong counter to Russia's brand new fleet of armored vehicles for a long while, as replacing the Afghanit at this stage would be far too difficult, and would put Russia's land vehicle programs at an unbearable delay, even further than the delay they're suffering at the moment.

The Road Ahead

The future lies in saturation capabilities. Today, the best example of combat between APS-protected vehicles is naval combat. Every ship is protected with vast arrays of air defense systems that can intercept missiles at different stages of their flight and different ranges, all the way from hundreds of kilometers to just tens of meters away from the ship. 

Protective qualities of ships are usually measured in their ability to sustain a certain saturation fire, and ASM capabilities are usually measured in their ability to apply pressure on the defensive array and force at least a single missile through for a given salvo.

The winner is usually the one who manages to either deplete his opponent's defensive weapons and still retain ASMs, or apply a saturated enough salvo that the opponent will not be able to handle in a single time.

Same will go for ATGMs. How do you do that? You work mainly on the price. Simplify the seeker, warhead, battery, engine, everything you can do to drive the cost down, you do. That, I believe, will soon become the new hot trend in missile-building technology, together with a light weight. Both will allow higher salvos per tank, ensuring quick depletion of the APS's munitions.

Regarding tanks, who will naturally also take a major part in anti-tank operations, will have to rely on faster rates of fire to deplete the enemy's APS quickly. The Abrams, for example, MAY have an autoloader planned at the moment for existing M1A2 tanks, as described in an old article of mine.

Sources

http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/05/20/time-arm-us-tanks-israeli-anti-missile-tech.html

http://armor-il.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/netherlands-first-aps-user-in-nato.html

https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/f134b420fc8f4d4889aaa06b2400c08e/2017-04-07-u-faf-2017-2025-english---final.pdf

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/rafael-to-debut-spike-lr-ii-missile-in-paris-437979/

http://defense-update.com/20170529_spike_lr_2.html

http://armor-il.blogspot.co.il/2016/12/abrams-to-get-drone-operating.html