100 first Israeli howitzers to be wheeled

As reported by YnetNews, the IDF will purchase the howitzers in multiple batches, the 100 first units of which are going to be wheeled, and perhaps semi-automatically loaded, although the wording is tricky on the last part.

The new howitzer will be built in an initial batch of 100 vehicles and will be based on a wheeled chassis. Follow-on howitzers may be based on tracked vehicles.

Now, I don't quite remember the exact numbers, but if I'm not wrong, there are, in the IDF:

4 artillery brigades - 2 active, 2 reserve.

Each brigade consists of 4 battalion of howitzers each.

The 2 active brigades are both split with 2 active battalions and 2 reserve battalions in each of them.

This puts us at 4 active battalions, and 12 reserve battalions.

So there are:

Active - 72 howitzers.

Reserve - 216 howitzers.

Each howitzer will be manned by a yet undetermined number of crewmen ranging from 3 to 5, and an overall reduction of 25% to 40% is envisioned, though yet unclear whether it refers to manpower, vehicles, or both.

My assumption is that each vehicle will be manned by 3 men, while another 2 (for a total of 5) will be in the ammo carrier vehicle. This is because it's normal to say the M109 has a crew of 9 to 11 (9 in the vehicle, and 2 in the resupply vehicle).

It is assumed that the typical battalion will reduce to 12 vehicles from 18, so a batch of 100 vehicles will be enough to fully equip 8 battalions, which are 2 whole brigades. And another 4 vehicles will be left for testing and demonstrations.

And of course, it's likely the 2nd batch of 100 vehicles, which will complete the transition of the artillery corps to a new howitzer, will be based on a tracked platform. If that will be the case, the wheeled platforms will be transferred to the reservists, and the tracked platforms will take their place in the active brigades.

This is a good move for 2 main reasons:

1)Tracked howitzers are only needed for maneuver combat. With a total of 192 howitzers (after the transition), hardly half will be required to maneuver anywhere. So it would be ideal if the reservists will have a system that will be easier and cheaper to maintain. A wheeled platform cuts down expenses tremendously.

2)Wheeled platforms are easier and faster to make, not only cheaper. So it would allow the IDF to re-equip its artillery forces before the M109 turn into rust buckets.

The decision to make them semi-automatic may be driven by the need to ramp up production to make up for lost time. The M109 had to be gone a long time ago, so even if the solution is not optimal, it's better than what there is now. But again, it is possible Ynet made a mistake in their reporting, as they said the system could also require no human input in the loading sequence.

The 2nd batch would also likely be with an automatic loading system, as the 2nd batch would not be as urgent, and as was said earlier that Elbit will strive for the maximum level of automation.

Plus, along with the fact that the wheeled and semi automatic howitzers will be used by the reservists most of the time, there is no real loss of capability here. They could be used in places where a high volume of fire isn't exactly necessary, or stay behind just in case a multi-front war begins.

Source

Merkava 3M

Announced last year concurrently with the announcement on the Merkava 4 Barak development, the Merkava 3 is set to become the 3M and receive the Trophy system. The project will take about 3 years, and will cover the 188th active armor brigade.

There has been some confusion around this topic. Some thought the IDF intends to equip the entirety of the Merkava 3 brigades with Trophy. It does not. I'll try to explain why.

The armored corps consists of 4 active armored brigades, and 8 in reserve. Those who finish their service are transferred to the reserve brigades where they undergo training to gain proficiency in the new tanks they're operating, because usually reservists' tanks are older and require time to get used to. The bigger the gap, the less effective they are after the transition. A serviceman on a Merkava 4M, the most technologically advanced MBT in the IDF, and one of the most advanced in the world, will face a serious shock if he's transferred to an early 1980's Merkava 2. All the advanced features he got used to, the tank's speed, its firepower options, the living conditions, the aiding devices in his previous station, are all gone.

For this reason, the IDF does not equip its active brigades first and only then the reservists. It zigzags between active and reserve.

The Merkava 3 brigade is also needed because its servicemen will have an easier time integrating in the 2 remaining Merkava 2 brigades and another Mark 3A brigade. It's very much possible that the IDF will choose to keep the Merkava 3 in active service for at least another 5 to 8 years, until the Merkava 2 tanks are either completely phased out, or one remaining that would be replaced by these Mark 3.

At the moment there is 1 fully equipped reserve brigades with Merkava 4A/B tanks, and another one is in the middle of its transition.

Armored Corps Brigades
Tag	Name	No#	Division	Command	Equipment
Active Brigades
	Storm from Golan	7	36th	North	Merkava 4M
	Barak	188	36th	North	Merkava 3D Baz
	Iron Tracks	401	162nd	South	Merkava 4M
	Bnei Or	460	80th	South	Merkava 4M and 3D Baz (also instructional)
Reserve Brigades
	Kiryati	4	319th	North	Merkava 4
	Zaken	8	91st	North	Merkava 3A
	Arel	10	252nd	South	Merkava 2
	Crushers	14	252nd	South	Merkava 3
	Oryx	37	162nd	South	Merkava 3D Baz
	Iron Fist	205	319th	North	Merkava 3D Baz
	Yiftach	434	210th	North	Merkava 3D Baz
	Steel Chariots	847	340th	Central	Merkava 2 Transitioning to Merkava 4

            

So back to the Trophy system!

When this brigade will be fully equipped with the Trophy APS in about 3 years, the IDF will simultaneously reach multiple milestones:

1)The entire active arm of the armored corps will be equipped with the Trophy APS.

2)It will have 2 armored divisions worth of APS-equipped combat vehicles.

3)The 36th will have 2 armored brigades with Trophy, and one infantry brigade with Trophy-equipped Namer APCs/IFVs.

4)The 162nd will have 1 armored brigade with Trophy, and 2 infantry brigades with Trophy-equipped Namer and Eitan IFVs.

And of course, by the time the US and Russia only start delivering APS-equipped tanks and AFVs to the frontline units, the IDF will already start transitioning its first APS-equipped tanks to reserve units, in about 2-3 years from now. And will start producing APS-equipped vehicles at a rate of 100 vehicles per year. 

Are there really 4th generation MBTs?

In many discussions today it is very easy to notice that many people refer to different MBTs as being of a certain generation, and often referring to just one tank as being of several generations. This became most apparent when the T-14 tank of the Armata universal ground combat vehicle family was publicly shown in May 2015, in the annual Victory Day Parade.
It was touted as the world's first 5th generation tank. This was confusing to many, because Russia had its own classification system that differed from the western one:

1st Gen - T-34.
2nd Gen - T-54/55.
3rd Gen - T-64.
4th Gen - T-90.
5th Gen - T-14.

Meanwhile, the Western classification system would remove the T-34 from the Russian system, and put every tank on the list one generation lower, and perhaps the T-14 would share the 3rd gen spot together with the T-90.

How do we define generations today?

Rolf Hilmes made the clearest definition to date:

1st Gen - Post WW2 tanks that would otherwise be referred to as Medium Tanks during WW2. 

2nd Gen - Enhanced night fighting capabilities, an NBC protection system (resulting from a massive nuclear arms race especially at the beginning of the cold war), and usually standardized tank guns. The British Royal Ordnance L7 was the star of the 2nd generation tanks in the western hemisphere.

3rd Gen - Composite armor, computerized Fire Control Systems, and a shift to even bigger main guns (120mm in the west, 125mm in the east).

The Centurion was a particularly famous example of 1st generation tanks, built as a reimagined Heavy Cruiser tank.

Tanks like the M1 Abrams, Leopard 2, and T-80, that are probably the first to pop into one's head when he thinks of 3rd generation tanks, have been around since the late 1970's. Within less than 40 years after the 2nd World War, 3 whole generations of tanks were developed and defined, but in the past 40 years leading to today, not one has been clearly defined.

Labels like "Next Generation" are a great marketing strategy for practically any modern piece of military hardware, to get everyone to think it's the latest and greatest but without clearly understanding what differentiates it from others.

How do we proceed from here?

What we need is new definitions for what a modern tank should have, and distinguish between the capabilities of modern tanks from the earliest examples of 3rd gen tanks of the late 70's.

Fortunately, in the past several years, tremendous improvements were made both to the construction of tanks' subsystems, and their conception. 

I have gathered a few recent and not so recent developments that may found a very strong basis for a 4th generation machine. While it would be most ideal if the next MBT would incorporate all these features and more, some of these technologies are less crucial than the others, and thus even if only a few of them were present, it would be possible to classify a certain tank as being a generational leap ahead of others.
For example, much like the composite armor technology reshaped tank design schools into a new thinking, APS are too redefining the concept of protection.

APS

Much like composite armor has revolutionized the tank-making industry, APS is revolutionizing the modern conception of tanks' usage and capabilities, and not incrementally increases their protection, but multiplies it.
In the post-WW2-era, tanks would be built with relatively thin armor, knowing they won't be able to fend off ATGMs or modern AP projectiles anyway, so might as well just invest in mobility. Shining example of this was the Leopard 1.
Then composite armor came, and countries with tank-producing industries could armor-up their tanks to provide sufficient protection against most threats, but still had to make compromises in where they would put this armor. Composite armor was still heavy, and thus only the front was truly heavily armored.

Today, with an APS, a tank could go in aggressively, do its job, and not even worry about being hit, let alone being penetrated or destroyed. These, of course, have limited munitions, but they do provide an immense tactical advantage.
Say, if a certain missile is highly prolific in a certain area and statistically would penetrate tank X about 50% of the time, and an APS has 6 charges, then the statistic reduces from 50% to 12%, meaning one would have to spend 8 missiles to destroy just one tank, instead of 2.

What this gives the tank is not only vastly increased survivability, but changes the way its once most dreaded foe, the concealed ATGM teams, have to operate, because the ATGM teams, or enemy tanks (if the APS can defeat KE) will now have to be a lot less aggressive and more concealed, which will hamper their capability to engage the enemy.

Unmanned Turret

These first made an appearance in IFVs as a new niche, as IFVs are generally lighter but larger vehicles, to whom a proper distribution of armor was a lot more sensitive issue. 

What these offer is increased protection to the crew - the turret is always more exposed, thus having it unmanned will keep the crew out of harm's way if it is compromised. 

Moreover, some may prefer to keep the turret less armored, or even un-armored, as it no longer houses the crew, and thus invest considerable amounts of armor on the peripheral protection of the hull. 

Whether keeping the turret un-armored is a good idea, is up for debate. But it is still possible to save a great deal of weight even if the turret is fully armored, because its internal volume will be greatly reduced, and the weight of the armor is a function of the volume it has to protect.

Crew Capsule

The threats of today have shifted away from long lines of main battle tanks facing each other, to hybrid warfare that combines technologically sophisticated weapons found usually only in full fledged militaries, with medium intensity gureilla warfare, done by non-nation actors.
As such, a typical MBT today can expect to fight against an enemy that conceals itself all around the MBT's area of operation but will employ advanced ATGMs and occasionally VBIEDs, mortars, and rocket artillery.

This means that the concept of survivability has shifted.
In the past, the most optimal solution was to armor-up the turret more than anything else, armor-up the hull front as well, and hide the ammunition and other hazardous equipment such as hydraulic systems where they are least likely to be hit. In some it meant below the turret ring, in some it meant the ammo was encapsulated and behind closed doors in the turret, with blow-out panels, or a combination of both approaches.
But what remains to this day is the fact that all tanks keep either some, or most of their ammo within the same compartment as the crew does.

The Abrams remains the sole tank in the world to have all its main ammunition in a separate compartment that does not endanger the crew. Most of its shells are located in the turret, which is un-conventional on its own, and either 8 (for 105mm) or 6 shells (for 120mm) are located in the hull with blow-off panels facing downwards.
But that alone does not solve the entire problem.

Encapsulating the crew compartment provides an additional advantage - The protected volume is significantly reduced. Which again means more armor around the crew.

You can see all 3 crewmen are seated at the front in a crew capsule, with the turret operated automatically via remote command.

Peripheral View System

Several such technologies are offered on the market, and one of them is already mid-way to become operational. 

Shining example of this is the Elbit's IronVision system that is due to enter service in 2020-2021. Another offering by BAE is the BattleView 360, which is an eyepiece.

Ukraine and Taiwan were also reported to work on this technology, but they are basing their products on civil technology that may be less secure.

Elbit's IronVision system is based on the JHMCS helmet that was developed for the F-35.

These offer the advantage of laying all the necessary information from the tank's computers onto a streamlined and comfortable UI, along with a peripheral view of the tank's environment without risking one's life. A common threat to tanks in an urban environment is the absence of a clear positioning of the enemy, as they could be everywhere, and an abundance of potential snipers. It creates a very hostile environment for every crewman who chooses to peek his head out because the panoramic commander sight is still limited in its capacity to scan the surrounding area.

So all in all it greatly reduces response time, and greatly increases one's perception of the environment.

Hybrid Electric Drive

Other than being environmentally friendly, hybrid electric engines provide many tactical advantages:

They are stealthy, allow higher acceleration and top speeds, and they don't put much logistical burden on the supply chain.

What I mean by stealthy is that they don't produce a heat signature and they're very quiet. It will make tanks considerably harder to detect at night. For a tank to obtain such capability, they'd usually use an APU, but they'd have to remain stationary for that.

Carmel future fighting vehicle with hybrid electric drive.

A hybrid electric drive could also significantly increase the combat range of the vehicle.

Current examples

The best two examples for a 4th generation tank today are the Israeli Merkava 4 and the Russian T-14 Armata. 

While currently the Merkava only features an APS out of all the above mentioned technologies, and the T-14 is not yet in service, they are both very close to becoming the first in-service 4th generation tanks.

How to do it right:

Merkava

By the year 2020 the first Barak tank, a heavily modernized version of the Merkava 4M, is set to enter service with a brand new hybrid electric powerpack, IronVision peripheral view system, and a next generation of APS. 

It will essentially be an upgrade of a tank designed in 1999-2003, so it will not be able to take radical changes like a crew capsule or an unmanned turret (logistical problem) but its modular nature allows it to remain "young" for a long while, and its newly acquired capabilities will allow it to be operationally miles ahead of the conventional 3rd gen designs.
Depending on the changes made to it, it could well be somewhat of a 4th generation tank.

For almost a decade now, the Merkava 4M sports an active protection system that gave it a tremendous tactical boost in several engagements.

T-14

The T-14 was lauded as the first of its generation, and indeed it is the first newly constructed MBT shown to the world in a long while, rather than an upgrade. And although it too doesn't feature all the technologies I've listed, it's impossible to put it in the same category as older 3rd generation tanks.

At the moment it features an Afghanit Active Protection System, with a total of 10 charges and capable of defeating APFSDS, at the cost of being unable to fire hard kill munitions at top attack missiles. It has a low profile unmanned turret, and a protected crew capsule.

It is the embodiment of a revolutionary concept that has been played around with by both the USA (M1 TTB) and USSR (and likely other European countries during the cold war).

Reports of its date of acceptance into service are very frequent and often conflicting. But it should enter service somewhere around the year 2020, and with the Taman Division that protects Moscow.

Abrams

Other countries are also making strides, albeit slower, but each to the pace that suits them.
The US's Abrams MBT has recently been fitted with a Trophy APS, which together with the SEPv3 upgrade, will give it a tremendous boost to its capabilities in all parameters.
Trophy was purchased as an urgent material request, and is an initial part of the long term MAPS program that intends to create a common, modular architecture for an active protection system that would allow to easily integrate any APS, or component of an APS into a vehicle, and thus create the possibility of combining multiple APS for their tailored needs.
They are also looking to combine additional tools to locate hostile fire via the Kongsberg-supplied CROWS Commander Remote Operated Weapon Station to detect small arms fire, and not just RPGs and ATGMs like the T-14 and Merkava do.

While it faces the same issue as the Merkava and Altay at the moment, of acquiring new capabilities through upgrades and not through a fresh design, it could acquire enough advanced capabilities to compensate for it.

The next generation of the Abrams is already envisioned with an autoloader and smaller base crew.

A contract has already been given to equip an entire brigade with the Trophy APS.

How to do it wrong:

Altay

The Turkish Altay tank has had a problematic history. It was first envisioned to enter service 3 years ago (in 2015) yet today it is unknown whether it will enter service before or after the year 2020.

The Altay is built on the basis of the South Korean K2 Black Panther tank and uses some of its features like hydropneumatic suspension and 120mm L/55 gun, but is overall a different tank with a crew of 4 men, no autoloader, stretched hull, and a different concept of protection. 

2 variants of the Altay were developed. One for conventional warfare, and the other for asymmetric warfare.

It is estimated that at some point, the Altay will come standard with the Akkor APS, also a Turkish domestic development that utilizes tube-launched grenades to defeat RPGs and ATGMs, and may potentially also defeat APFSDS type shells. 

Although it does use an APS and is a very young design, it almost appears to follow the steps of the notoriously badly designed Challenger 2 tank, which within less than a decade since it gained initial operational capability, started having obsolescence issues and required deep and expensive modernization efforts.
The Altay is a new tank that could have been designed with modern approaches to crew protection in mind, but simply wasn't.
As mentioned above, it retains a larger crew of 4 still laid out in a conventional setup in which all crewmen are dispersed at different heights and different points in the tank, and thus vastly increase the required protected area.
It also retains an ammo rack at the front section of the hull beside the driver, which as shown in multiple conflicts already (Turkish operations in Syria being the primary example), is a very dangerous and completely unnecessary setup. This ammo is in the same compartment as the crew is, and thus it is vulnerable in low/medium intensity conflicts where an ATGM could come from everywhere.

The Altay missed an amazing opportunity, and will likely either remain in service long enough for contemporary designs to out-match it with new concepts, or will have a relatively service life to take advantage of these same new concepts.

Conclusion

At the moment, at least one tank can be described as a 4th generation tank - The T-14, which was designed as such from scratch. Others possess similar advanced capabilities, or more capabilities, but suffer from the inherent design flaws of the previous generation of tanks.

And a few recent ones, unfortunately, were designed without taking into account new trends, such as the Altay, perhaps leading to them becoming obsolete sooner than others, as happened to the Challenger 2 tank that due to its outdated requirements, has become obsolete decades before its contemporaries would be considered such.

The 4th generation of tanks will be manned by a crew of 2 or 3 sitting in an armored, have an unmanned turret, have an APS or multiple layers of APS, and possess technologies that enhance its situational awareness significantly compared with the previous generation.

Conclusions from the 2nd Lebanon War

The 2nd Lebanon War has been a controversial topic for many who showed interest whether in modern armored warfare.
Most of the debate comes down to the performance of the Israel Defense Forces Armored Corps in that war, although the problem was much bigger than that.
The stars of that war were the Merkava tanks on the one side, and Hezbollah AT crews armed with a wide range of ATGMs on the other side.

The rather poor performance of the IDF, as well as the Armored Corps, can be tied to the wrong-perceived reality that the future is in low intensity conflicts that rarely, if at all, include tanks, artillery, and high intensity warfare tactics.

After that war, the IDF has had a total shake-up and is now in perhaps its best condition ever. It prepares for high intensity conflicts at all times, spending peak amounts of money on training, and finances modernization programs in all branches of the military to obtain both greater savings for financing future projects, and relevant capabilities in the modern battlefield.

So now I present you the conclusions the IDF made after the 2006 war that explain in part why the Armored Corps performed poorly, and how it prepared to fix the issue:

Conclusions

1)Command & Control Procedures - Emphasis on Mission and Battle Management

• 26% of tanks hit were operating in non-core missions.
• Partial (incomplete) Combat Procedures preceded 65% of tank hits.
• There was an issue in the clarity of the mission and its understanding in light of the target.
• Frequent unit restructurings caused confusion between the commanders (overburdening in combat procedures to observe).
• Throughout all days of the operation, the organic structure of the unit was broken including within tank units.

2)Tank Operation and Co-Operation

• Tanks were used unprofessionally by the commanders.
• Tanks as an immediate and available asset to the Platoon Commander and Company Commander.
• 62% of tank hit cases were in areas under friendly control.
• 56% of tank hit cases were in missions without any infantry support.
• No "common language" between tank commanders and infantry.
• No opening of logistical lines for replenishment of the tanks.
• Gaps in common techniques with engineering corps (opening lines, mutual recovery, "living space"/camps).
• Few combat vehicles in significant phases of combat.
• Peripheral defense of combat vehicles was poorly executed.
• Inexperienced command, partially due to restructuring.
• Insufficient observation duties.
• Inability to provide logistical support to combat vehicles.
• In 89% of tank hits, no artillery was called up.

3)Drills and Doctrine (Tactics, Techniques, Protocols, Procedures)

• Most drills and procedures were proven relevant.
• Nonetheless, they were quantitatively lacking:
• Fire extinguishing drills insufficient.
• Battle line combat (from entrenched positions) drills unsatisfactory for the set conditions of the war.
• Foot combat drills insufficient.
• Fighter sturdiness, in the context of in-tank staying, insufficient.

• Crew experience in implementing drills is insufficient:
• Handling of AT threats (smoke was not activated in 46% of cases, 94% of tanks hit were static or slow).
• Driving in mountainous areas.
• Carrying and using assault means.
• Activation of track-spreading/tearing IEDs.

4)Weaponry

• Lack of complementary equipment for mechanized warfare: Infantry transportation, command transportation, logistics, and evacuation.
• Lack of weaponry to counter AT threats: Smoke, 60mm mortar, reliable means of missile identification, quick evacuation kits.
• BMS as a power multiplier - updating the forces with a clear picture, common language between branches, and prevention of friendly fire incidents.
• Protection was insufficient (45 tanks were hit by 50 missiles (note: could be translation issue), 23 tanks were pierced and disabled - over 51%).
• 30% of tanks were hit by the first missile.
• 11% of tanks hit have suffered detonation of ammunition.
• A damaged tank creates media resonance that hurts recruitment of reservists and their morale.
• A gap was created in the effective answer for infantry and structures for 120mm cannons.
• Lack of night vision equipment for commanders.
• Lack of mobile comms for dismounting the tank.
• Lack of belly plates - limited numbers in light of increasing threat.

5)Training

• In 47% of hits, there were notable deficiencies in crew performance.
• Training gaps were especially noticeable at the operation beginning, and in units that trained less, or trained procedures outside the tanks.
• Noticeable deficiency in mechanized infantry and recon infantry training alongside tanks.
• Co-operation exercises almost didn't happen.
• Lack of frame-work exercises.
• Co-operation exercises on the battalion level were partially completed, and their focus was not on the in-company cooperation.
• Platoon structure - Platoons that operated in pairs enjoyed swiftness, agility, and increased control. Platoons that operated in threes enjoyed from increased survivability, depth of operation, and wider missions.
• Battalions that did cooperate with the mechanized infantry claimed it to be a real force multiplier in the aspect of tank peripheral security, observation, local infantry combat, and wounded evacuation.

Recommendations

Doctrine - Combined Arms

• Implementation of the existing doctrine on high intensity combat, properly.
• Focusing on close combat techniques and their updating.
• Doctrinal institutionalization of the heavy mechanized combat.
• Effective use of infantry - Finding balance between captured space, and space used for fire and special means.
• Reducing friction in AT-saturated areas.
• Operation of tanks in frame-works.
• Writing techniques for combination of armor and engineering assets.
• New artillery drills for disturbance of a large area, to disrupt AT threats.
• Stability of the pairings even at the cost of optimal matching of the mission scale.
• Strengthening the observation capabilities for opening firing cells (active battle area), from different directions and with varying signatures.

Doctrine - Armored Corps

• Adapting techniques for fighting from prepared positions.
• Checking situations in which on-foot-action should be mixed, and implementing them into the doctrine.
• Setting criteria and drills for abandoning a tank (including fire fighting drills).
• Set up operational perception for deceptive actions.

Weapons

• Develop platforms for auxiliary missions - mobilizing infantry, command, and logistics.
• Determine whether to keep the mortars or scrap them and add smoke mortar shells to the tanks.
• Strengthen the BMS-less tanks with computers that allow quick areal analysis. 
• Test solutions for diverting the ammo explosion out of the fighting compartment.
• Provide solution against the first missile through active protection, jammers, and advanced smoke systems.
• Equip all tanks with 2nd generation smoke systems.
• Develop 120mm round for soft targets.
• Pre-set all firing charts (firing solutions) of all possible rounds into the FCS.
• Create tank-looking dummies and spread them on the battalion level.

Organization

• Determine the tank platoon structure - the necessity of an additional tank in light of the possible threat, needed protection, and additional tasks.
• Accelerate equipment of BMS and provide solution to unique forces (heavy engineering equipment such as bulldozers).
• Test organizations of specialized companies (spearhead, breach etc etc). In light of lack of means and need in specialty.
• Return the means of smoke-screening to the tanks.
• Organic infantry / Mechanized infantry - the topic is currently handled by the HQ.
• Provide mobile comms to tanks (for dismounted operation).
• There is need is setting up a geological-operational body that will assist commanders in opening lines.
• Reconsider the ammo setup considering the types of targets and to minimize threat to the crew.

Debate

• Long Range Movement - Other than a select few places, no combat movement exceeded several kilometers at a time.
• Protection - A threat that minimizes the strengths of the tank and amplifies its weaknesses (Fighting in the "Grinding Mill" area, lack of artillery and kinetic threat, AT as a main threat and lack of protection means). 

Note: By "Grinding Mill" they mean an open area where tanks are exposed from many directions, and are targeted by concealed targets well spread out, typically in an ambush, with an overwhelming amount of firepower.

• Firepower - Inefficient use of firepower due to excessive forces in the maneuvering area, problematic cooperation, and "wealth" of special fire.
• Breathing space - No breathing space for the combat vehicles due to lack of logistical lines.
• Overcoming natural obstacles - Done, but requires improvement and specialized techniques.
• Exploiting power - Activation of parts of frameworks, hardships in concentrating efforts, and inefficient combined arms.

Summary

1. To complete the wide range of missions, the combined arms needs to balance between the "light" capabilities and "heavy" capabilities as a function of the characteristics of the combat situation, and constraints.
2. The heavy maneuvering was done in a very partial and incomplete way.
3. As for the light maneuvering:

• Fighting area was fairly limited.
• Low signature enemy.
• "Wealth" of artillery and special means (alternatives to tanks).
• Ability to compensate for the lack of heavy maneuvering through aerial supply and evacuation.
• Fighting in comfortable weather conditions.

             All these created the illusion that most of the missions could be completed through light                       maneuvering alone.

The text was translated directly from the "Shiryon" (Armor) magazine:

Shiryon magazine, Issue 50.

Eitan and new years' update

It's been a while since news came about any major development in AFVs in Israel. We're kept in the dark for now, about the artillery project, which seems to be delayed until inspection by the MoD is finished regarding corruption allegations.

Eitan

• Costs half the price of a Namer.
• Costs 1/10th the engine-time of a Namer.
• Reached well over 100km/h on trials but may be limited to 60km/h in transportation mode as it's expected to drive on highways in emergency time rather than on HETs (Heavy Equipment Transporters). But the speed governor could also be removed when needed.
• MANTAK will present this month its recommendations for an APS for the Eitan - Iron Fist or Trophy, a decision said to be worth hundreds of millions of shekels (Every Trophy system costs 1 million shekels roughly, which is 300,000 USD).
• ERA as well as the passive composite armor are said to be sufficient against current threats.
• 3 screens are located inside the vehicle - 2 large "21 screens for the commander and driver, and 1 smaller one by the rear door.
• Engine could come from either MTU or Caterpillar.
• Initial operation capability in 2019.

What this means

• For now a total of 500 Namers are planned. Some in service and some in production, albeit slow one. For the same price as another 500 (originally the IDF wanted 800 or more), over 1000 Eitans could be acquired which makes them more open to auxiliary duties such as mortar carriage, repair and maintenance, recovery and more, where the Namer would be too expensive. And since these duties require no turret and no APS, it could cost even 1/3rd as much as the Namer.

• Training a battalion worth of Namers would cost as much as 3 brigades of Eitans. Impressive savings, but these can be attributed probably to the fact the Namer's engine is the old AVDS-1790 which in its early iterations served the Patton tanks.

• No comment here, other than it being odd that they just gave it a top speed of 90km/h at first when it could do well over that. Previously they gave it a governed speed of 50km/h I believe, which now changed to 60km/h. Perhaps some automotive improvements they didn't disclose.

• This is a big one - we were promised way back in 2014 that RAFAEL and IMI will set aside their former rivalry in this exact topic but it seems now that the next generation of APS will no longer be a combination of both their systems, and rather would be another competition between the two. I don't know yet whether this is good or bad, but I do feel some disappointment.

• When talking about the Eitan, the military officials and media always refer to just one incident - the Shujaiya (Gaza) rocket attack that killed 7 men in an M113 troops transporter. The rocket was an RPG-29 (PG-29V). So if the IDF claims the Eitan can, without an APS, resist the RPG-29, then by all means this is an impressive feat. Generous claims are for 600mm penetration after ERA, and 750mm without ERA, which is quite substantial.

• Just like the Merkava 4, but unlike the Namer, the Eitan will have the BMS Tzayad (Hunter, marketed by Elbit as Torch) integrated into the main computer, laying everything on one screen in front of the commander. Though judging by the photos below alone, it's not yet obvious where the gunner's display is.

• Which probably means that an electric or hybrid engine is now off the table. The available offerings right now are: C18 and 6V 890

Eitan

Namer

And for the first time in ever, the IDF released some statistics on its acquisition this year. It's not much, actually not enough even, but it's something. 

The short list

The only two important bits are that the Merkava 4 and Namer are both produced at a rate of 30 vehicles per year, each. This makes sense for the Namer, which is due to have the 500th unit delivered by 2027, which means today there are ~200 units, but that's a really low number. At peak production, the plant could produce 120 Merkava tanks a year. And that was more than 30 years ago.

And that's it for today!

Source:

https://www.yediot.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5066561,00.html?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=yediot%2520page&utm_campaign=facebook%2520page

Namer as LAND 400 Phase 3 contender

Monthly Australian defense outlet DefenceTechnologyReview has since the beginning of the Australian LAND 400 program, held a monopoly over information on the program, and perhaps other parallel programs that are part of Australia's recent push to modernize its equipment across all domains.

You can find their digital journal here: https://dtrmagazine.com/

LAND 400 is a program that is set to bring the Australian Army renewed capabilities in the form of a wheeled Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles (CRV) in the 2nd phase of the program (1st phase was for requirement setting), and tracked IFVs in the 3rd phase, to replace the ASLAV and M113 platforms (respectively) currently in service, which are considered obsolete.

Phase 2 is already in an advanced stage, and two last contenders were downselected: Patria's AMV35 with an E35 turret, and the Boxer A2 with a Lance turret.
Phase 3 has yet to begin, but is closely related to the Phase 2 as it favors a bidder who integrates the same turret as the Phase 2 winner. Although commonality is a trait sought after by every armed forces as of long ago, it harms the competitive nature of the program as the winner of the 2nd phase will have a strong edge in the 3rd phase. Finding an optimal solution would be difficult. It is possible to award each competitor enough money to do integration works of the winner's turret in the 2nd phase, but the bidder who won in the 2nd phase will have the edge of smaller expenses.
This directly relates to the Namer IFV.

Namer recently tested with new turret, turning it into an IFV

Currently, the Puma from KMW, Lynx KF-41 from Rheinmetall, and CV9035 from BAE are expected to participate in the 3rd phase of the LAND 400 program. They all have commonality with the 2nd phase.
The Namer will be a an odd ball among them.

Introduction to Namer

Since the mid-90's the concept of utilizing a Merkava chassis for an APC was considered. A Merkava 1 was to be re-engineered to fit a squad of infantry in a special compartment. In 2004, the then-concept got a push and turned into an active program. This was due to what is known as the "APC disaster" (plural), when 2 M113 APCs (named Zelda in Israel) were destroyed with cheap AT weapons, and the fighters inside died. Footage of soldiers searching through the sand for remains of the deceased soldiers were deeply embedded into the public's memory.

In 2005 a prototype was shown, and in 2006 the program got another kick because of the lessons learned in the 2nd Lebanon War, as Hezbollah utilized highly powerful AT missiles/rockets such as Kornet-E, Metis-M, Toophan (Iranian copies of TOW), RPG-29 and more.

Namer prototype on Merkava 1 chassis. Notice flat sides.

In 2008 the production began, but so far only 1 brigade was equipped with the Namer, due to budget cuts. This means most of the IDF's front-line units are still equipped with either Achzarit or M113 APCs. Production was ground to a halt at some point, but currently the rate of production is said to be at 30 vehicles per year, and possibly doubled since the 2014 operation in Gaza. An estimated 600 vehicles are planned overall, and this is supported by the current contract given to RAFAEL and Elta in the sum of 1,041 Million NIS, or ~$300 million, solely for Trophy APS systems for Merkava 3 and 4 tanks, Namer APC/CEV/IFVs, and Eitans. The contract is due to end in 2027 and started in 2016.
In 2007 the cost of a single Trophy system was estimated at $300,000, which means that even if costs hadn't reduced, and they have, roughly 1,000 systems can be procured.
Of course, development costs are also included in this contract, but even if half the sum is utilized for acquisition, it's still an impressive number of front-line units that can be practically immune to a whole range of AT weapons.

In 2009 two Namer vehicles were tested in combat in Operation Cast Lead, and in 2014 already operated on a brigade level. They proved their worth against all threats found in Gaza, against the Hamas-employed Kornet missiles, RPG-29 rockets, and heavy IEDs that usually weighed hundreds of kilograms.
RPGs of various sorts, unknown whether tandem warheads or not, were used to no effect against the Namer, which proved to be invulnerable all around.
In another incident, the Namer reportedly took a Kornet missile to the side. The missile was said to have pierced the armor, but the crew and troop compartment remained uncompromised and none was injured. It leaves room for thought as to what was meant when they said the armor was pierced.
Perhaps more remarkably, the Namer drove beside a multiple story building which was booby-trapped with an IED that reportedly weighed well over a ton. The Namer was hit by the sheer force of the blast and had the building collapse on it, however again none was harmed.

In 2015 the Namer CEV was unveiled in 3 sub-variants aimed to replace the Centurion-based Puma CEV currently in service. It featured among other things increased internal capacity for a tenth passenger.

The Namer CEV was the first to feature a Trophy APS

In 2017 the Namer IFV was finally unveiled with a 30mm turret, featuring also a 60mm mortar, dual Spike missile launchers, and a Trophy APS already integrated. The idea of having a 30mm turret on it was experimented with for over half a decade, but budget cuts delayed it until now.

Another program that was in the running was replacement of the 1,200hp AVDS-1790-9AR from the Merkava 3 with the 1,500hp GD883 (previously MTU883) engine of the Merkava 4, which other than being more compact and lighter, is more powerful. However the GD883 also costs about 3 times as much as the AVDS does, while not offering a significant enough leap in power, thus the program was eventually muted and possibly cancelled.

Advantages of the Namer

Protection

Its protection level is higher than that of an MBT. The 22 tons saved by removing the turret were re-invested in armor protection over the already well protected hull. 

Built in Israel, the Namer doesn't follow NATO protection standards and suits everything to its needs, thus it is impossible to assess its actual protection in numbers. However, its front is similarly armored to the Merkava 4, which makes it capable of taking hits from high caliber cannons such as 120mm and 125mm guns firing modern munitions. 

Its sides are protected by thick slabs of passive and reactive armor, giving it an excellent and wider frontal arc compared to other APCs/IFVs, allowing it to take large caliber fire over a wider arc, and likely providing sufficient protection to make it immune to medium caliber fire, which most opt to have only the front protected against.

Against IEDs, its sheer weight of 60 to 63 tons (depending on variant) together with a thick belly plate and V-shaped hull, will make it a tough nut to crack. Higher weight translates to less noise, which then translates to fewer injuries. 

To further enhance its protection, the Namer is fitted with laser warning systems, automatically deployed smoke systems, and the Trophy APS which is a force multiplier for every vehicle.

The Namer, even without APS, however, is by far the most well protected vehicle in the competition, and probably the most well protected ground vehicle currently in service anywhere.

The second most well protected vehicle in the competition is the Puma IFV, weighing 43 tons. The Puma officially provides protection in accordance to level 6 of STANAG 4569 on the sides, through the use of ERA, and above that on the front. How much above that? Not known, but likely not too much.

The difference is quite high.

Firepower

It is the sole vehicle guaranteed to use the Trophy so far, and the Trophy has a unique feature to it - Slew to Cue. Upon detection of a threat by the Trophy system, the source of fire is located and the gunner can choose to slew the gun onto the target automatically, then fire the gun after the gun has been laid by the Trophy system.

It provides a boost to situational awareness by locating targets at a high rate, and closing the firing loop much more quickly, a vital aspect that is usually overlooked.
Kinetically, it's not too far from the front runners of the Phase 2 program. It sports the same Spike LR 2 missiles that are most likely to be chosen by Australia.
It also has a 60mm mortar which might be advantageous, but the downside is that Australia may not have, or even want to develop a doctrine for its use, i.e want to use it at all.

Integration

Having the Trophy integrated saves time and integration funds, and gives an edge in the lengthy process of the program. Same goes for the integration work of Spike LR 2 missiles, although it can use any existing Spike CLU if available information is correct.

Disadvantages of the Namer

Mobility

Being a 60 ton behemoth is no easy deal when you're expected to maintain a level of tactical and strategic mobility. 

Transporting them across the vast Australia will prove a fuel consuming journey similar to moving around Abrams MBTs.
Add to that the fuel consumption of the vehicles themselves and not merely the transporters, and you get a potentially expensive vehicle to operate.

Firepower

It currently features a 30mm cannon, whereas the competition uses 35mm cannons, so a 35mm cannon has to be integrated. RAFAEL and Elbit usually state their turrets can accommodate larger cannons (than 30mm) but the Namer's turret is made by MANTAK, a military institute and thus it's unknown how many provisions for improvement were given to this turret. 

Elbit ATMOS partially fails demonstration

"Globes", an Israeli economy-centric news outlet who has in the past few months been the only source of information on the development of the IDF's future cannon artillery, and has taken a firm stance against MAFAT's conduct of selecting a single supplier in an allegedly flawed bid, now reports about a failed demonstration.

Elbit's ATMOS - The artillery piece intended for the IDF will be fundamentally different, and Elbit refused to show the prototype to the public.

Elbit's howitzer was said to have been demonstrated and tested twice at least. Once a month ago, and the other 2 weeks ago. The demonstration in the past month was said to be very successful, but we do not yet know how much of the system's capabilities were demonstrated, and whether or not certain parts were left out for later tests.
What we do know is that in at least one occasion, the automatic loading system has failed, and led to halting the demonstration.

Sources inform "Globes" that the trial of the new ATMOS cannon selected by the Ministry of Defense at the end of a controversial procedure was halted. Some of the capabilities of its automatic loading system were not demonstrated at all to representatives of the Ministry of Defense Administration for the Development of Weapons and Technological Infrastructure and IDF artillery corps officers.

This is not something extraordinary. Things like this happen, especially in the rather short schedule Elbit is working on. 

Elbit failed to comment on the issue, but a "source" in the IDF relevant to this topic has said the issue has been fixed.

Something else, however, is disturbing - the IDF has yet to showcase the new artillery piece.

The Eitan, Namer + CEV, Carmel, were all shown to the public in one way or another before testing begun (in case of the Carmel, a 3D render). The Eitan's first prototype was built about a year before it was shown, but even then it was defined to the public in an appropriate way.

The ATMOS is not so much. Actually, we can't really call it an ATMOS, because we know it will be fundamentally different and acquire a Hebrew name, but we don't know just HOW different it will be.

It could be based on a truck. It could be based on an Eitan, or it could be based on the Namer (a hybrid of the Merkava 4 and 3). It could even be based on an independent and specially designed platform like the Rascal was, for all we know.

But what this means is probably that the IDF itself doesn't yet know what they want from this new howitzer other than the parameters they set for the turret.

Strangely, Elbit are also declining to show the turret prototype, and have maintained this stance since at least April when it was acknowledged a prototype was already built.

Source

http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-elbit-atmos-artillery-performs-disappointingly-in-trial-1001203583